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Executive Summary 
 
This paper seeks to better understand the determinants of pro-poor outcomes in value 
chain projects. It is motivated by a desire to examine scepticism regarding the widespread 
use of value chain projects as poverty-alleviation tools. The thesis is guided by the following 
questions 
 
i. Can value chain approaches to rural development benefit the poor in a direct 
manner?  
ii. Under what circumstances can value chain approaches to rural development 
achieve the most substantive and significant pro-poor outcomes? 
 
In particular, the paper focuses on asset-poor agricultural producers (including farmers), 
which are referred to as poor producers for the sake of brevity. As such, pro-poor 
outcomes refer to beneficial outcomes for asset-poor agricultural producers. 
 
To address these two questions, the paper is divided into three chapters. Chapter one 
explores the concept of the value chain. Through this it highlights an increasing emphasis 
on value chain projects among donor organisations, as well as a lack of thorough 
monitoring and evaluations of these projects. 
 
Chapter two develops an understanding of pro-poor outcomes in value chain projects. This 
understanding is developed in a three-stage process. First, a review of existing academic 
literature, donor documents, and independent evaluations of value chain projects is 
conducted (Section 2.1). The aim of the review is to develop an understanding of value 
chain participation, particularly the terms by which participation can occur. 
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Second, the paper identifies ten key factors affecting the ability of poor producers to 
participate in and directly benefit from value chains (Section 2.2). They are: labour 
intensity; asset specificity; commodity differentiation; long-run price stability; perishability; 
time-horizon and frequency of benefits; vertical coordination; horizontal coordination; 
vertical integration by producers’ associations; and lead firm. 
 
Third, the paper synthesises these findings into a testable analytical typology consisting of 
six key determinants of pro-poor outcomes. These are: labour intensity; specificity; 
resilience; perishability; income smoothing; and governance of linkages. This analytical 
typology is intended to serve as a conceptual framework on which value chain selection, 
design, and implementation may be structured. The typology is presented in terms of the 
likelihood that value chains will achieve pro-poor outcomes (Section 2.3). This typology 
serves as the paper’s principal output, and can be both applied to, and tested using future 
value chain projects. 
 
Chapter three applies the typology to an assortment of IFAD’s on-going value chain 
projects. The aim of this section is to offer an example of how the typology could be 
applied in practice (Section 3.2). This is done to guide future research on pro-poor 
outcomes in value chain interventions. Two projects are given particular attention. These 
two cases exemplify how the typology can be applied to value chain project designs to 
create falsifiable hypotheses on whether the projects will achieve pro-poor outcomes. The 
intention is that future projects will utilise similar hypotheses to test the typology’s 
explanatory power (for a proposed methodology, see Appendix). 
 
In the conclusion, the paper offers recommendations for future research. 
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Introduction 
 
Over the past twenty years, the value chain approach to rural agricultural development has 
grown in popularity among development donor organisations, including AusAID, DfID, GIZ, 
and USAID. This development model seeks to promote the inclusion of smallholder farmers 
in formal markets through targeted investments and strategic interventions in value chains. 
By promoting the formalisation and commercialisation of agricultural activities, this 
development approach seeks to use agriculture as a driver of economic growth. 
 
More recently, organisations such as the International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD) have adopted the value chain approach to promote poverty reduction. Value chain 
projects are thought to address poverty directly through the commercialisation of non-
commercial producers, and indirectly by stimulating broader rural development. There are, 
however, significant uncertainties as to the potential for the poor to participate directly in 
value chains. In spite of these uncertainties, little supporting empirical evidence has been 
offered — a troubling reality given the substantial sums of money invested in these 
projects. 
 
Given these uncertainties, this thesis is guided by the following questions 
 
i. Can value chain approaches to rural development benefit the poor in a direct 
manner? 
 
ii. Under what circumstances can value chain approaches to rural development 
achieve the most substantive and significant pro-poor outcomes? 
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In particular, the paper focuses on asset-poor agricultural producers, which are referred to 
as poor producers for the sake of brevity. As such, pro-poor outcomes refer to beneficial 
outcomes for asset-poor agricultural producers. 
 
To address these two questions, this paper will be divided into three chapters. In the first 
chapter, the concept of the value chain will be discussed. It will chart the increasing 
emphasis on value chain projects among donor organisations, as well as the shortcomings 
of the monitoring and evaluations of these projects. Chapter two will develop an 
understanding of pro-poor outcomes in value chain projects. To do so, a review of existing 
academic literature, donor documents, and independent evaluations of value chain 
projects will be conducted (Section 2.1). The paper will then identify the key factors 
affecting the ability of poor producers to participate in and directly benefit from value 
chains (Section 2.2). Building on the review, this paper will present a testable analytical 
typology consisting of six key criteria. This analytical typology is intended to serve as a 
conceptual framework on which value chain selection, design, and implementation may be 
structured. The typology will be presented in terms of the likelihood that a respective value 
chain project may deliver pro-poor outcomes (Section 2.3). This typology will serve as the 
paper’s principal output, and can be both applied to, and tested using future value chain 
projects. Chapter three, the typology will be applied to on-going IFAD value chain projects.
1
 
The aim of this section is to offer an example of how the typology could be applied in 
practice (Section 3.2). This is done to guide future research on pro-poor outcomes in value 
chain projects. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
1
 The selection of projects was limited to those for which sufficient information was available in 
order to draw conclusions as to the likelihood of achieving pro-poor outcomes. 
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Chapter One 
 
1.1. The concept of the Value Chain 
 
The concept of the value chain was popularised in Michael Porter’s Competitive Advantage: 
Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance (1985). Michael Porter’s value chain concept 
merged several streams of business management theory (Altenburg, 2006), and 
contributed a more nuanced understanding of business strategy by advocating for a firm 
level, network approach. In particular, it focused on 
 
i. The competitive advantage derived from horizontal and vertical market linkages, 
and 
ii. The value added at each linkage. 
 
In this context, linkages refer to the relationships between two or more market 
participants. Vertical linkages refer to the relationships between market participants 
engaged in different stages of the production process. While horizontal linkages refer to 
relationships that connect market participants within the same stage of the value chain. 
 
The value chain identifies a firm as a link within a chain that enables a product to move 
from pre-production to final consumption. A typical value chain will contain input 
providers, producers, processors, packagers, suppliers and retailers. In this sense, the 
concept of the value chain is relational. It promotes the perspective of a market participant 
embedded in a network of meaningful relationships, which can only be understood relative 
to the value chain in which the market participant operates. 
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1.2. The development agency approach 
 
The insights developed in academia have more recently been incorporated into the work of 
development donor organisations. According to Altenburg (2006), this rise in attention 
among members of the development community has been driven by four underlying 
assumptions 
 
i. Economic growth leads to pro-poor outcomes 
ii. High economic growth rates are dependent on internationally competitive 
economic sectors 
iii. Global integration is facilitated by the development of formal relational networks 
iv. Development is about the integration of actors into marketable activities while 
balancing competitiveness and equity 
 
More explicitly, the value chain approach to economic development asserts a direct causal 
relationship between pro-poor outcomes and the engagement of poor producers and 
processors in value chains. Riisgaard and Ponte (2011) argue that central to much of the 
value chain literature are the assumptions that supplying formal value chains 
 
i. Automatically generates greater income and other benefits for the asset poor 
ii. Enables pre-production investment, knowledge and technological assistance to 
overcome barriers to entry. 
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1.2.1. Value chain interventions 
 
Building on the understanding of the importance of developing and managing formal 
market linkages, value chain projects are designed to intervene in markets — often 
intervening in pre-existing value chains, but at times building entirely new ones
2
 (Henriksen 
et al. 2010, p. 1) — so as to create equilibria that are more suitable for the poor. In the 
context of using value chains as a development tool, Henriksen and colleagues (2010) 
suggest that 
 
First, Value chain development can be understood as any concerted effort to improve the 
conditions in the value chain. It usually implies a change in participation of beneficiaries in 
value chains, enhancing rewards, and/or reducing exposure to risks. Rewards and risks 
should be understood not only in financial terms but also in relation to the environment, 
poverty alleviation and gender equity. 
 
Second, Value chain interventions are focused on improving or forging vertical linkages 
along value chains (in production, processing and trade functions) with the view of 
improving the functioning of the value chain and/or terms of participation of selected 
beneficiaries. Interventions may be targeted at domestic, regional or international value 
chains (p. 2). 
 
While there is no fixed form that a value chain intervention will take, five stages are typical. 
These are 
 
                                                          
2
 The more new markets, linkages or chains are developed, the more risk is accrued by those 
involved. “The consequences of developing radically new products, new markets or new linkages 
may be unpredictable [...] To the extent that poor people have few resources to cope with such 
unpredictability, it may be more prudent to improve the performance of existing value chain 
wherever possible” (Humphrey and Navas-Alemán 2010, p. 44). 
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i. Selection of potential value chains, based on potential growth in the participation 
and economic development for the poor 
ii. Analysis of potential value chains, which will include 
a. Mapping of key value chain actors 
b. Market analysis of the distribution of rents 
c. Identification for potential upgrading 
iii. Design of the value chain intervention strategy, focusing on constraints and 
opportunities 
iv. Implementation of the value chain intervention strategy 
v. Monitoring and impact assessment 
 
1.2.2. Why the Value Chain Approach? 
 
The development community’s adoption of the value chain approach can be understood as 
an attempt to rectify the mistakes of past rural development strategies. In particular, 
development strategies that aimed exclusively at increasing producers’ productive 
capacities failed to maintain a balance between supply and demand. Without access to 
markets, the resulting excess supply at times jeopardised the target groups’ asset bases 
(Visser et al. 2012, p. 24; Vorley et al., 2011).
3
 
 
Through the formation and strengthening of market linkages, value chain approaches seek 
to overcome these hurdles, and provide a degree of income consistency that the poor 
desperately need. The rural poor’s lack of assets make them particularly vulnerable to 
exogenous shocks, either environmental or market-based (see World Bank, 2013). As a 
result, this demographic is considered to be highly risk averse, and often disinclined to 
invest in their own productive capacities — investments that are necessary for income 
growth (Norell and Brand, 2012). By providing a regularised and guaranteed source of 
                                                          
3
 IFAD’s Nigeria Root and Tubers Expansion Programme serves as a prime example of how a project’s 
inattention to market linkages can lead to oversupply, and a subsequent collapse in prices (see 
Hartmann and Hamp forthcoming, p. 16). 
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income, vertically coordinated market linkages (e.g. contract farming) in value chains help 
overcome the rural poor’s understandable aversion to risk (Riisgaard and Ponte, 2011). 
More specifically, Raswant and Khanna (2010) describe this aversion to risk as just one side 
of a sort of low-skill, low-income equilibrium. They state that “...there will be no 
investment by entrepreneurs unless supply is assured, and farmers will not produce more 
unless markets are assured. This dilemma can be addressed by financing the development 
of value chains through interventions that can address the supply and demand constraints 
simultaneously” (2010, p. 1). Without formal linkages between production and 
consumption, market actors may hesitate to make the investments necessary to drive 
growth in the sector, and thus in the incomes of its participants. 
 
As well as ensuring that supply is matched by stable and consistent demand, the value 
chain approach also focuses other important factors, such as assistance with the provision 
of necessary inputs. Vorley and colleagues (2011) suggest that the numerous noteworthy 
benefits of participation in value chains include 
 
i. Higher returns through increased prices and higher productivity 
ii. Improved quality of output 
iii. Access to credit, inputs and technology 
iv. Reduction in vulnerability and risk 
v. Improved food security 
vi. Improved organisational capacity 
 
1.2.3. Agriculture in poverty reduction 
 
The emphasis on value chain interventions among donor organisations is built around 
growing recognition of the potential to reduce poverty through agricultural development. 
Many among the rural poor already possess the requisite skills needed to drive 
development and growth in the agricultural sector, as the majority are already involved in 
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subsistence or asset-poor agricultural production (Sjauw-Koen-Fa, 2012; Mazoyer, 2001). 
Given the prevalence of smallholder farmers throughout much of the developing world, 
increased productivity and commercialisation is thought to offer a means of ensuring that 
the benefits of economic growth are distributed in a reasonably equitable manner (World 
Bank, 2008; Cornia, 1985). 
 
Meanwhile, a supply-side shortage of food and agricultural products is predicted by many 
to be a looming threat (Sjauw-Koen-Fa, 2012; Wegner, 2012). A growing population, 
increased environmental degradation, decelerating increases in crop yields, and the effects 
of climate change are all predicted to undermine the world’s food supply in the near future 
(IAASTD, 2009). As a result, there will be significant demand for agricultural output in the 
years to come — demand that could be met by increasing the output and access to markets 
of the world’s many smallholder farmers (Sjauw-Koen-Fa 2012, p. 15). 
 
1.2.4. Challenges of the value chain approach to development 
 
It is, however, important not to overstate the pro-poor potential of the value chain 
approach to development. For interventions to be feasible and sustainable, value chain 
participants must be economically competitive. The need for competitiveness in value 
chain interventions is both an asset and a liability. One the one hand, achieving economic 
competitiveness ensures that the dynamic created by the intervention is sustainable, 
contributing to long-term poverty alleviation. On the other hand, it may also serve as a 
barrier to entry for poor producers. Notable challenges include 
i. Integration of poor producers into value chains increases the transaction costs for 
downstream actors, hence the tendency for large buyers to prefer transacting at 
scale 
ii. Vertical coordination can facilitate crucial pre-production assistance for asset poor 
producers, so too does it require a level of market power that would allow a lead 
firm to unduly exploit producers 
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iii. The focus on integrating poor producers into lead firm value chains risks addressing 
the needs of downstream value chain participants rather than those of the 
producers themselves 
iv. Insufficient attention to core business models of value chain participants risks 
creating an unsustainable market equilibrium that may fall apart after the project’s 
completion 
 
To produce favourable and sustainable outcomes, it is crucial that there be congruence 
between producers’ assets and the needs of the value chain in which they participate 
(Vorley et al., 2011). Such productive assets include physical, financial, natural, social, 
cultural, political and human capital. A lack of any one of these assets could exclude a 
producer from a value chain, or jeopardise its sustainability after the project’s completion. 
 
Consequently, where a large gap exists between available and necessary assets, 
investments by donor organisations may prove too costly with respect to the potential 
benefits. The smaller the gap between available and necessary assets, the more cost-
effective the intervention will likely prove to be. This highlights the importance of context-
specific factors in determining not only the degree of expected pro-poor benefits (World 
Bank, 2013), but also the cost-effectiveness of a given intervention. 
 
 
1.3. The prevalence of value chain projects 
 
The value chain approach to development has become increasingly popular among 
development donor organisations over the past decade. USAID, the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, DfID, GIZ and AusAID are particularly vocal advocates of the value chain 
development model. While having embraced the value chain approach later than other 
donor organisations, IFAD has more recently become one of its stronger proponents. In its 
Strategic Framework 2011-2015, IFAD states that one of its principal thematic 
engagements will be the “integration of poor rural people within [agricultural] value 
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chains” (2011, p. 8). This focus on the integration of the rural poor into formal markets 
represents a substantive departure from the organisation’s rural development strategy 
prior to 2004. Value chain projects as a percentage of all projects approved by IFAD in a 
given year rose from 3.3% in 1999 to roughly 70% by 2011 (see  
 
Graph 1: Value chain projects as a percentage of all projects approved by IFAD Executive 
Board). 
 
 
Graph 1: Value chain projects as a percentage of all projects approved by IFAD Executive 
Board 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation, adapted from Hartmann and Hamp (forthcoming) 
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It is worth noting that project comparisons across organisations can be difficult, as there is 
no unified definition of a Value Chain Intervention. The approach to both the design and 
implementation of value chain interventions varies between organisations. Nevertheless, a 
common aim — to improve market participation of selected beneficiaries by investing in 
their ability to engage in, and manage, market linkages — is recognisable. 
 
 
 
1.4. Monitoring and evaluations of value chain projects 
 
1.4.1. Biases in the available literature 
 
The review of literature conducted in this paper is assumed to suffer from three sources of 
bias. First, without a large and representative household level data set, identifying the 
unique causal effect of a value chain intervention on poor producers is highly problematic. 
Second, development agencies may have an incentive to under report negative results. 
Given that independent evaluations of value chain project outcomes are scarce (Humphrey 
and Navas-Alemán, 2010), we assume that some evaluations produced by agencies not 
involved in the initial project design and implementation may over-report pro-poor 
outcomes. Finally, the existing literature on agricultural value chains overwhelmingly 
focuses on global value chains, in part because there is greater data availability for such 
projects. Meanwhile, it is likely that the value chain interventions with the greatest 
potential to achieve pro-poor outcomes will be those designed around local value chains — 
chains in which the costs and risks of participation tend to be much lower. This focus on 
global value chains may therefore negatively bias the literature review (Section 2.1). 
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1.4.2. Insufficient and ineffective empirical evidence 
 
These biases are symptomatic of a broader deficiency in the monitoring and evaluations of 
value chain projects. As interest in the value chain approach has grown, so scrutiny of its 
underlying assumptions has increased. In 2010, the Institute of Development Studies 
explicitly articulated this concern, stating that 
(i) there is not enough evidence on poverty alleviation impacts from these 
interventions to claim that they are effective or efficient in helping the poor, and (ii) 
the poverty focus of value chain interventions is not clear (which of the poor are 
being targeted, what kind of poverty is being targeted and how). 
- Humphrey and Navas-Alemán (2010, p.29) 
 
The IDS noted an associated, but distinct, confounding problem of attribution 
 
evaluations and impact assessments that provide some form of comparison with 
control groups may well show that some of the many positive benefits that seem to 
arise from value chain interventions […] may not be attributable to the 
interventions, or could equally be achieved through different types of interventions. 
- Humphrey and Navas-Alemán (2010, p.58) 
 
In other words, even where evidence may superficially appear to suggest a positive 
response to a value chain intervention, this response may in fact be attributable to another 
explanatory variable. 
 
While impact assessments are undoubtedly important — methodologically compromised 
evidence is better than no evidence at all — the problem of attribution in impact 
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assessments is compounded by the general systemic complexity within which a value chain 
operates. In a report for the Swiss Development Agency, Daniel Roduner (2007) argues that 
 
Value chains tend to be very dynamic and there are numerous actors and factors 
contributing to change. This means that it will likely be difficult to identify an 
impact even if it exists. Large datasets — which are likely to be costly to compile — 
will be needed to estimate poverty impacts. Moreover, to get valid data would 
imply that the net effect of an intervention is isolated from all other extraneous or 
confounding factors that influence defined impact. However, we have learned that 
many (confounding) factors are at play in effecting the changes observed at a 
highly-aggregated level. Therefore these changes cannot be reliably and 
proportionately traced back to any one intervention or program. We are in a 
complex system (p. 22). 
 
Yet despite these methodological problems, impact assessments remain the only credible 
means of identifying and attributing positive outcomes to specific value chain interventions 
(Altenburg, 2006). Many projects attempt to gauge the impact on poverty through various 
other measures. Common indicators include the number of smallholder farmers that a 
project successfully links to formal markets. Yet measuring effects on poverty via such 
proxies can prove highly problematic. 
 
The simplest measure, the number of farmers linked to a new market, is only part of the 
story. Linking small-scale producers to markets does not automatically lead to development 
and improved livelihoods, although many claims in CSR and business development reports 
would suggest otherwise (Vorley at al. 2009, p. 14). 
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It is not simply the lack of impact assessments that is troubling, but also the relative 
inattention given to the poor in project design and evaluations. To this end, Henriksen and 
colleagues (2010) suggest that 
 
Concerning the inclusion of broader development goals — such as poverty 
reduction, gender equity and environmental sustainability — the depth and quality 
of analysis and the degree to which it informed target chain selection, design and 
implementation was limited. Although all projects had some form of generic 
targeting of poor people, only few projects detailed poverty levels along the chain 
and targeted the poor further by geographic differentiation or by social groupings 
(p. 37). 
 
As these statements suggest, empirical evidence of the pro-poor benefits of the value chain 
approach is severely limited. 
 
1.4.3. Theoretical complications 
 
Accompanying the inadequate monitoring and evaluations of value chain projects are 
reasons to question the theoretical assumptions underlying the existing value chain 
literature. First, the asset poor generally lack the skills necessary to participate in formal 
value chains. This entry barrier is exacerbated by a historic underinvestment in rural 
infrastructure (Vorley et al., 2011) — infrastructure necessary to integrate poor producers 
into formal value chains. Second, formal markets are typically unwilling to tolerate the level 
of uncertainty associated with a producer’s dependence on natural rainfall and 
inconsistencies in quality, quantity and timeliness of output — all common characteristics 
among poor producers. If the inclusion of poor producers in value chains were 
economically rational, they would play a greater role in existing commercial food 
production and distribution. However, “most cases or pilots of smallholder inclusion are 
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supported and subsidised by the public sector and civil society, or are CSR-driven by the 
private sector” (Sjauw-Koen-Fa 2012, p. 6). 
 
Given the growing prevalence of the value chain approach and the lack of empirical 
research in support of its use as a poverty-reduction tool, further analysis of the link 
between value chain projects and their effects on the poor is undoubtedly necessary. It is in 
recognition of this that the following section reviews the existing work — both academic 
and otherwise — connecting these two concepts. It then synthesises this array of existing 
work, and uses it as the basis for the development of an analytical typology — one that can 
be used to either assess the pro-poor potential of existing value chain projects, or assist in 
the design and implementation of future projects geared toward these ends. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Chapter two of this paper will seek to develop a more profound understanding of the key 
determinants of pro-poor outcomes in value chains projects. To do so, it will first review 
academic literature and donor documents relating to value chain participation, value chain 
power dynamics, and their collective effects on the distribution of rents among value chain 
participants (Section 2.1). Second, the concepts developed in the review will be applied to 
the development context, with an explicit focus on the poor. This process will serve as the 
basis for the development of ten key factors affecting the poor’s ability to benefit from 
value chain participation (Section 2.2). To facilitate their analytical applicability, these ten 
factors will be operationalised by synthesising them into a typology. Comprising this 
typology will be the six principal determinants of pro-poor outcomes in value chain projects 
(Section 2.3). This three-step process is summarised in Figure 1: Chapter two structure. 
 
 
Figure 1: Chapter two structure 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
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2.1. State-of-the-art: Factors affecting producers’ participation in 
value chains 
 
This state-of-the-art will review the existing literature and documentation relating to 
agricultural value chains. The purpose of this section is to develop a more profound 
understanding of the factors that affect participation in value chains, and the terms by 
which this participation occurs. Given the limited body of literature that links value chain 
interventions and poverty reduction, this review will draw more heavily from other related 
fields, notably supply chain management and agricultural economics. This section will be 
divided into two principal subsections: commodity-specific factors and value chain 
governance structures. 
 
2.1.1. Commodity-Specific Factors 
 
When produced efficiently, different commodities require different enabling environments 
and combinations of inputs. By their very nature, commodities may also produce and 
perpetuate particular value chain power dynamics. In particular, commodity-specific 
factors have a significant bearing on value chain participation, as well as the distribution of 
market power and rents among a value chain’s participants. 
 
To begin, participation in value chains for particular commodities may be limited to those 
able to meet specific prerequisites. In some instances, these prerequisites may erect 
barriers to market entry. Examples of such barriers include the necessitation of large-scale 
landholdings, stringent operational standards, and large volumes demanded by buyers 
(Seville, Buxton and Vorley, 2011; Okello, Narrod and Roy, 2011; de Schutter, 2009), all of 
which are examined below. 
 
The first factor affecting value chain participation is the level of transaction costs incurred 
by buyers. In particular, smallholders are often excluded from value chains because of the 
transaction costs that would be incurred by buyers seeking to procure large volumes of 
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commodities (Vorley et al., 2011; de Schutter, 2009; Csáki and Forgacs 2007, p. 224; Dries 
et al. 2007, p. 228; Pingali et al., 2005; Omamo, 1998). To this end, Reardon and Huang’s 
(2008) study of the determinants of value chain inclusion and exclusion found a statistically 
significant negative relationship between farm size and participation in both dairy and 
tomato value chains (p. 27). 
 
Meanwhile, niche value chains are considered to be more conducive to participation by 
smallholders (Vorley et al., 2009; Staley and Morse, 1965). This has been attributed to the 
smaller production volumes typically demanded by buyers serving niche markets (Kula et 
al. 2006, p. 4). In markets with greater volume-based demands
4
, buyers are less likely to 
source from smallholder producers (Sjauw-Koen-Fa, 2012). While a large number of 
smallholder producers could supply the equivalent quantity, buyers reduce their 
transaction costs by instead transacting with a limited number of large producers (Vorley et 
al., 2009; Seville, Buxton and Vorley, 2011). Given that the quantities demanded in niche 
markets are generally smaller than in their non-niche counterparts, the transaction costs 
incurred by buyers forming linkages with smallholders are reduced. 
 
Second, operational standards can also act as a barrier to participation in agricultural value 
chains (Lee, Gereffi and Beauvais, 2012; Reardon and Huang, 2008; Augier et al., 2005; 
Reardon and Berdegué, 2002). Commodities with a high risk profile
5
 are generally 
characterised by restrictive health and food safety standards, as well as stringent 
monitoring practices (de Schutter, 2009; DfID, 2004). Commodities with a high risk profile 
include meat, dairy, and fresh produce (Wegner, 2012). As downstream actors have grown 
increasingly liable for upstream activities, such private operational standards have emerged 
as a top-down instrument to ensure traceability and accountability throughout a value 
chain (Vorley, 2003). Meeting these operational standards often requires sizeable 
investments, which may only be economically efficient at scaled production (Riisgaard and 
Ponte 2011, p. 35). The costs of compliance can be prohibitive, preventing smaller 
                                                          
4
 Markets in which economies of scale play a more important role, as is often the case with staple 
crops. 
5
 The risk profile of a commodity is a function of the uncertainties involved in its production and 
distribution (FAO, 1997). For instance, meat is considered to have a high risk profile because of its 
need for careful handling and monitoring, as well as the severe human health issues that may arise 
from neglecting these best practices. 
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producers from participating in a value chain (Okello, Narrod and Roy, 2011; Kirsten and 
Abdulrahman, 2011; Sautier et al., 2006). To this end, Olivier de Schutter suggests that 
compliance [with operational standards] has often required higher levels of 
capitalization than many smallholders [can] afford, and the high costs of 
monitoring and compliance over a large number of units have been an incentive for 
export companies to switch from smallholders to larger commercial farms. 
-    2009, p. 15 
 
In the case of GlobalGAP standards
6
, a joint IIED-NRI (2008) study found that the cost of 
compliance for smallholder producers exceeded half their profit margins, while producers 
themselves received no price premium to offset these incurred costs. Producers can be 
forced to bear the costs of implementing these food safety and traceability standards, 
while the benefits accrue to downstream actors (Asfaw, Mithöfer and Waibel, 2008; 
Altenburg 2006, p. 47-48). 
 
In addition to affecting the patterns of value chain participation, commodity-specific 
factors also affect the terms by which this participation occurs. In particular, commodities 
have been observed to have a significant impact on the distribution of market power 
among value chain actors (Visser et al., 2012; Kula et al., 2006; Masten et al., 1991; 
Williamson, 1983). Market power is itself a key determinant of the terms of trade by which 
value chain participants transact (Dodd and Asfaha, 2008; Dobson, 2005). At its most 
extreme, market power can allow an actor to engage in oligopolistic or oligopsonistic 
behaviour (Rogers and Sexton, 1994). Examples of such behaviour include anti-competitive 
pricing and the externalisation of operating costs onto other value chain participants 
(Competition Commission, 2008). 
 
First, the distribution of market power can be affected by the specificity of the assets used 
in a given value chain (Visser et al., 2012; Vukina and Leegomonchai, 2006; Joskow, 1988; 
Williamson, 1983). The more specific an asset, the less transferable it is. This can have one 
                                                          
6
 A set of private sector-led health, food safety, and product traceability standards jointly followed 
by Europe’s major food retailers. 
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of two effects. Assets that are specific to a particular production relationship
7
 can empower 
those who own them. This is because unique assets reduce the ease with which the asset 
owner may be replaced should the production relationship deteriorate (Masten et al., 
1991; Joskow, 1988). This increases the dependence of other value chain actors on 
maintaining this production relationship. However, specific assets can also disempower the 
owner. This is because they reduce the ease with which the asset owner can abandon the 
production relationship, as the economic return on specific assets is, by definition, likely to 
decline when transferred to another context (Williamson, 1983). The direction of 
dependency in a production relationship is a function of contextual factors, including the 
type of asset (for an explanation of the types of specific assets, see Masten et al., 1991; 
Williamson, 1983). 
 
Second, the distribution of market power can be affected by the perishability of a 
commodity (Berg et al. 2006; Sexton et al., 2005; Richards and Patterson, 2003). The 
greater the perishability of a commodity
8
, the more inelastic producers’ supply will be, as 
output must be sold more quickly after harvest (Richards and Patterson 2003, p. 1-2). 
These time constraints limit a producer’s flexibility when transacting with buyers, 
decreasing the producers’ market power. This increases the opportunity for buyers to 
influence transactions and put downward pressure on commodity prices (Sexton et al. 
2005, p. 2). To this end, Berg and colleagues (2006) found that cassava’s high perishability 
undermined Ghanaian producers’ bargaining power, as well as the prices they received (p. 
33). Meanwhile, processors and distributors were found to be in a much more favourable 
bargaining position (Berg et al. 2006, p. 34). 
 
Beyond their effects on market power, commodity-specific factors can also affect the 
distribution of rents in a given value chain. First, the production of more differentiated  
                                                          
7
 Assets whose value is higher in the context of that market linkage than it would be elsewhere. 
8
 For example, “Fresh cassava is a highly perishable product which starts to rot 2-3 days after 
harvest. As poor producers cannot afford to keep cassava in the soil until market conditions are 
favourable, they sell their produce at any price, especially when there is a glut” (Berg et al. 2006, p. 
33). 
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commodities
9
 typically increases the total value added along a value chain (Birthal et al., 
2007; Kula et al. 2006, p. 6; Davis, 2006). Such commodity differentiation is achieved either 
through the inherent rarity of a commodity, or through the process of ‘product upgrading’. 
Characteristic of the former are high-value niche commodities whose production is limited 
to particular geographic regions (Birthal et al. 2007, p. 427-428). Meanwhile, the latter is 
achieved by reducing the substitutability of a commodity through an increase in its quality, 
and thus value (Kaplinsky, 2006; Humphrey, 2004; Gibbon, 2003). Examples include 
producing a higher grade of livestock, or the fundamental reorientation of a commodity’s 
underlying value proposition by producing in accordance with Certified Organic or Fair 
Trade standards (Norell and Brand, 2012). 
 
Second, commodity-specific factors can also affect the distribution of rents within 
individual value chain segments (Berg et al., 2006; Sciaballa and Hattamm, 2002). Certain 
commodities are simply more conducive to labour-intensive production processes. 
Kaplinsky and Readman (2001) argue that such labour-intensive productive processes 
generate increased levels of employment, and therefore lead to a more equitable 
distribution of the income generated (p. 2). To this end, Certified Organic farming projects 
are often particularly labour intensive (Berg et al., 2006, p. 28; Darnhofer et al., 2005), and 
are often associated with positive development outcomes (Scialabba and Hattamm, 2002). 
 
2.1.2. Governance Structures 
 
This section will first examine the range of value chain governance structures typically 
observed in agricultural value chains. Second, it will identify some of the key constraints on 
value chain development. Finally, it will review the empirical evidence on how these 
constraints can be overcome through alterations in value chains’ governance structures.
10
 
 
                                                          
9
 Those which are more unique and less substitutable when taken to market (Kaplinsky, 2006). 
10
 As this literature review focuses on the conditions under which value chain development can 
achieve pro-poor outcomes, the focus of this section has been on the effects of governance 
structures, rather than their determinants. For a discussion on the determinants of governance 
structure selection see Kula et al., 2006. 
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The analogy of a chain alludes to the interlinked relationships between value chain 
participants (Diagram 1). These interlinked relationships – or linkages – between and within 
value chain segments enable a product to move downstream (i.e. from its inception to final 
market), and for credit, information, and inputs to move upstream (Kula et al., 2006; 
Henriksen et al., 2010; Stamm and von Drachenfels, 2011). For value chain participants to 
function effectively, some coordination mechanism is necessary (Humphrey and Schmitz, 
2001; Kaplinksy and Readman, 2001; Kula et al., 2006; Sautier et al., 2006; Rich et al., 2009; 
UNIDO, 2009; Vavra, 2009; Riisgaard and Ponte, 2011). 
 
Christopher Barrett (2011) identifies three forms of coordination that can fulfil this role 
(see Diagram 1) 
i. vertical coordination, which exists between value chain participants of different 
segments 
ii. horizontal coordination, which exists between value chain participants of the same 
segment, and 
iii. complementary coordination, which exists between value chain participants that 
offer complementary services. 
 
Diagram 1: Conceptualisation of an agricultural value chain 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation      
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These different forms of coordination combine to define the overall value chain 
governance structure. While different types of governance structures are identified within 
the literature, there is consensus that they exist along a spectrum (see Table 1) (Swinnen 
and Maertens, 2006; Sautier et al., 2006; Bijman, 2008; Gyau and Spiller, 2008; Vermeulen 
et al., 2008; Vavra, 2009; Webber and Labaste, 2010; Torero, 2011; Minot, 2011). 
 
Table 1: Types of governance structures 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
 
At one end of the spectrum are spot markets. Horizontal and vertical coordination in spot 
markets are minimal, as they are characterised by many buyers and sellers. This leads to a 
lack of repeated interactions, limited information sharing, significant flexibility, and 
independence (Webber and Labaste, 2010). In spot markets, price signals replace 
horizontal and vertical coordination as the principal coordinating mechanism (Kirsten and 
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Sartorius, 2002; Bijman, 2008; Vavra, 2009). Commodities typically produced and traded in 
spot markets include staple root vegetables, cereals and pulses (Vermeulen et al., 2008; 
Minot, 2011). 
 
At the other end of the spectrum is full integration. In the context of full integration, all 
value chain activities are internalised by a single participant, with horizontal and vertical 
coordination also internalised (Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002; Bijman 2008; Webber and 
Labaste, 2010; Minot, 2011).  Full integration complements commodities which are most 
economically produced at scale, such as sugarcane, oil palm, and rubber, as well as 
commodities which have high operational standards (Vermeulen et al., 2008; Minot, 2011). 
 
Situated between these two extremes are a number of intermediary types of value chain 
governance structures (Wainaina et al., 2012). While governance of the value chain can be 
a function of either horizontal or vertical coordination, vertical coordination typically 
precedes horizontal coordination (Kula et al., 2006). Vavra (2009) identifies two 
intermediary types of coordination: marketing and production contracts. Marketing 
contracts refer to pre-production agreements on the terms of sale (e.g. quantity, quality, 
timing, and price), while production contracts refer to agreements that include pre-
production assistance (e.g. credit, information, and inputs).  Gyau and Spiller (2008) add 
two additional types, categorising governance structures along a spectrum from long-term 
relationships, marketing contracts, production contracts, and contract farming. Webber 
and Labaste (2010) phrase this variation differently, listing: market relationships (i.e. spot 
markets), balanced relationships, direct relationships, and hierarchical relationships (i.e. 
vertical integration). Vermeulen and colleagues (2008) introduce the concept of an 
outgrower scheme. An outgrower scheme enables processors to guarantee a minimum 
level of supply through production on their own plantation, with any unmet demand 
purchased from smallholder producers (Gyau and Spiller, 2008; Minot, 2011). 
 
To better understand the usefulness of these governance structures, an understanding of 
the key constraints on value chain development are necessary. Those identified in the 
literature include: (i) high transaction costs due to high transportation costs and poor 
physical infrastructure; (ii) poor information flows, resulting in information asymmetry in 
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buyer-seller relationships; (iii) low human capital stock; (iv) lack of foreign direct 
investment in high value commodities; (v) low value final markets; (vi) weak legal 
institutions; and (vii) high costs of production inputs (Minten et al., 2009; Shelley, 2011; 
Adekunle et al., 2012; World Bank, 2013). 
For example, poor infrastructure can be a substantial barrier to participation in value chains 
as it: (i) increases transportation costs
11
; (ii) exacerbates commodity-specific issues like 
perishability; and (iii) limits access and the ability to respond to final markets (UNIDO, 2009; 
Dorward et al., 2011; Torero 2011; Asenso-Okyere and Jemaneh, 2012). These constraints 
combine to increase the production and transaction costs (i.e. marketing costs) for all value 
chain participants. Cadot and colleagues (2006, p.4) find evidence that marketing costs for 
remote Madagascan producers ranged between 124 and 153 per cent of the average 
subsistence farmer’s annual profits. Similarly, Shelley (2011, p.17) find that poor access to 
markets meant that 80 per cent of Mongolian raw cashmere in 2003 was sold at farm gate 
prices 10 to 45 per cent below the market price. 
 
It has been suggested that marketing costs are especially prohibitive for high value 
commodities (Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002; Minot, 2011; ul Haq, 2012). This is because high 
value commodities are typically more perishable, prone to volatile prices, and have higher 
operational standards (Birthal et al., 2005; Bijman, 2008; Torero, 2011). Their high 
perishability requires investment in specific infrastructure assets, such as refrigerated 
transportation and cold storage (Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002; Birthal et al. 2005). Yet access 
to such infrastructure support can be scarce. Evidence suggests that across India, cold 
storage facilities are only capable of storing 10 per cent of the total output of perishable 
commodities (Birthal et al. 2005 p.29; Birthal et al. 2008, p.27). Similarly, high value 
commodities susceptibility to price volatility is in turn due to the smaller volumes traded, 
greater perishability, and uncertainty of yield quantities (Birthal et al., 2005; Bijman, 2008; 
Brenton, 2012). 
 
Over the last decade a number of authors have noticed a tendency towards increased 
coordination, particularly vertical coordination, and away from spot markets (Humphrey 
and Schmitz, 2001; Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002; Sautier et al., 2006; Swinnen, 2007; 
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 Typically the largest component of marketing costs (Barrett, 2011). 
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Swinnen and Vandeplas 2007). This increased coordination can help mitigate the 
constraints identified above by encouraging larger value chain participants to invest in 
value chain development in return for guarantees on product quality, quantity, and 
timeliness of delivery (Adekunle et al., 2012; Asenso-Okyere and Jemaneh, 2012). Paul 
Collier and Stefan Dercon (2009) suggest that increased coordination can best be achieved 
through lead firms that are able to exploit economies of scale in the trading, marketing, 
and storage of commodities. 
 
Empirical evidence into the effect of increased coordination has indicated its association 
with (i) increased incomes; (ii) reduced transaction and production costs; (iii) improved 
information flows; (iv) greater access to capital; and (v) income smoothing effects. 
 
A substantial body of quantitative research indicates that integrating producers into value 
chains with greater vertical coordination increases producer income. Warning and Key 
(2002, p.259) offer evidence that incomes for 32,000 contract producers in Senegal were 
55 per cent higher than for non-contract producers. This finding has been corroborated by 
a variety of other studies, which associate greater vertical coordination with increased 
incomes, profitability, greater income stability, and shorter lean periods (Birthal et al. 2008; 
Minten et al. 2009). However, while Gyau and Spiller (2008) also find that increased vertical 
coordination has a substantive and significant effect on improved economic performance, 
its effect on behavioural performance (e.g. trust) was statistically insignificant. 
 
A strong body of literature suggests that participating in a horizontally and vertically 
coordinated value chain can enable poor producers to access appropriate technologies, 
secure inputs, access markets, and respond to market information (Kirsten and Sartorius, 
2002; Bijman, 2008; Webber and Labaste, 2010; Barrett, 2011; Asenso-Okyere and 
Jemaneh, 2012; Wainaina et al., 2012). For example, Minten and colleagues (2009) find 
that on-farm monitoring of producers by lead firms can enable more efficient and effective 
use of compost and fertilisers. Birthal and colleagues (2005) find that milk and spinach 
producers participating in marketing arrangements achieved slightly reduced production 
costs, but substantially reduced transaction costs compared to non-participating producers 
(see Table 2). These reductions in transaction costs were achieved because the contracting 
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buyer committed to collecting produce from local villages, providing input services, 
improving information, and enabling access to technologies at wholesale rates. 
 
 
Table 2: Production and transaction costs of contract and non-contract producers in India 
(Rupees per ton) 
 
Commodity 
Contract farming Non-contract farming 
Production  
cost 
Transaction  
cost 
Total cost 
Production 
cost 
Transaction 
cost 
Total cost 
Milk 5,586 100 5,686 5,728 1,442 7,170 
Chickens 808 38 846 27,322 90 27,412 
Spinach 1,485 35 1,520 1,630 437 2,067 
Source: Birthal et al. (2005, p.16) 
 
Increased coordination can also address the constraints on producers’ access to capital 
(Minten et al., 2009; Seville et al., 2011; Jones and Webber, 2010; Donovan and Poole, 
2011; Torero, 2011). Barrett (2011) argues that low incomes, limited resources, low 
productivity and vulnerability are mutually reinforcing constraints. First, low incomes 
prevent the accumulation of resources, limiting the opportunity to invest, which limits 
future incomes. Second, these limitations increase poor producers’ risk exposure by 
increasing their sensitivity to exogenous shocks. Increased access to capital may therefore 
offer significant and noteworthy benefits. 
 
Furthermore, increased coordination can smooth the seasonal variability in producers’ 
incomes. Minten and colleagues (2009) find that a key benefit of contract production of 
green bean producers in Madagascar was the greater income smoothing and shortened 
lean periods experienced by producers. Meanwhile, Michelson and colleagues (2012) find 
that contract producers for Walmart experienced significantly less price volatility than 
other producers. A particularly prominent example of increased coordination resulting in  
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increased price stability and income smoothing has been the Fairtrade certification 
programme. In a study of 33 participating producers, Nelson and Pound (2009, p.8) find 
that 27 reported decreased price volatility, while 29 reported increased incomes. 
 
However, the evidence suggesting that increased coordination can provide price stability 
and income smoothing effects should be treated with some caution. Attritional effects may 
skew the results towards a positive bias. To this end, Minot and colleagues (2009) argue 
that increased coordination may exhibit a positive effect on price stability and income 
smoothing, in part because those programmes that are ineffective do not survive long 
enough to be observed. 
 
Meanwhile, a number of studies indicate that vertical coordination has had a negative 
impact on producers. To this end, Sautier and colleagues (2006) argue that the trend away 
from spot markets excludes smallholder producers and leads to the consolidation of 
agricultural holdings. Key and Runsten (1999) demonstrate that in Latin America, where 
producers have been excluded from value chains, this has exacerbated power inequalities. 
Furthermore, a number of studies published in Little and Watts (1994) find that although 
contract farming across Africa has increased incomes for contract farmers, these increases 
have come at the expense of increased social tensions and power imbalances in value 
chains. Meanwhile, a number of studies find that income stability and ease of selling, 
facilitated by lower transaction costs and reduced risk exposure, is more important than 
increased incomes (Minten et al., 2009; Singh, 2008; Neven et al., 2009; Michelson et al., 
2012). It should also be recognised that a basic level of infrastructure is necessary to 
develop coordination (Birthal et al., 2005). Finally, Nicholas Minot estimates that less than 
5 per cent of African farmers are currently engaged in vertically coordinated value chains 
(2011, p.5). 
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2.2. Discussion: Identifying the key factors affecting pro-poor 
outcomes 
 
The purpose of this section is to develop the concepts introduced in Section 2.1 by (i) 
reorientating the focus to better account for the poor; and (ii) drawing explicit connections 
between concepts introduced in Chapter 1 and the empirical findings discussed in Section 
2.1. In so doing, this section identifies ten key factors affecting the likelihood that the poor 
will benefit from participation in agricultural value chains. These ten key factors are 
 
i. Labour intensity 
ii. Asset specificity 
iii. Commodity differentiation 
iv. Long-run price stability 
v. Perishability 
vi. Time-horizon and frequency of benefits 
vii. Vertical coordination 
viii. Lead firm 
ix. Horizontal coordination 
x. Vertical integration by producers’ associations 
 
In order to utilise the concepts developed in the previous section (Section 2.1), this section 
assumes that anything observed to limit or undermine the participation of smallholders will 
have an effect of similar, if not greater magnitude on the participation of the poor. 
Furthermore, many of the concepts developed in the state-of-the-art are combined with 
one another, and with the understandings developed in donor documents, to develop an 
understanding of the poor’s participation in value chains. Indeed, while the previous 
section lacked a focus on the poor due to the limitations in the empirical literature, this 
section explicitly focuses on their ability to participate in value chains, and to benefit from 
this participation. 
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These ten factors are developed in large part using the concepts and understandings 
already developed in Section 2.1. For the purposes of clarity and literary comprehension, 
these previously developed concepts are not re-referenced in this section. Any new 
concepts or source material introduced in this section — concepts and material not found 
in Section 2.1 — are referenced accordingly. 
 
2.2.1. Labour intensity 
 
The labour intensity of the production process has a significant bearing on the participation 
of poor producers. There are two principal reasons why this appears to be the case. First, 
the greater the labour intensity of production, the more labour is required to produce a 
given level of output. The resulting increase in labour demand would absorb a larger 
quantity of available rural labour than would otherwise be the case, allowing more 
individuals to benefit from value chain development. Second, as labour-intensive 
production processes typically require less start-up capital, these chains are less likely to 
erect barriers to entry. As such, it is more likely that poor producers will be able to freely 
enter and exit a labour-intensive value chain. 
 
However, it is important to note that labour-intensive value chains may be characterised by 
a large number of smallholder producers. This would increase transaction costs for buyers, 
and may dissuade downstream actors from forming linkages with poor producers (Vorley et 
al., 2009). Alternatively, labour-intensive value chains may also take the form of large-scale 
farms that employ a significant number of workers. Under these circumstances, transaction 
costs are less problematic. Overall, labour-intensive value chains appear to distribute rents 
more equitably and reach a greater number of beneficiaries, but may struggle to engage 
downstream actors due to the potential for higher transaction costs. 
 
2.2.2. Asset specificity 
 
Asset specificity also appears to have a significant bearing on poor producers’ participation 
in value chains. This is because more specific assets are less easily transferred to another 
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value chain should an existing production relationship fall apart. This affects both the value 
chain’s dependency dynamic, as well as the distribution of market power among the value 
chain’s participants (Visser et al., 2012). Recognising that the dependency dynamic can 
either favour or hurt poor producers, it is informative to differentiate according to the 
source of the investment. If producers invest in specific producer assets, they are likely to 
be dependent on maintaining the production relationship for which the investments were 
made. On the other hand, if a lead firm invests in specific producer assets, their 
dependence on maintaining the production relationship increases. In vertically coordinated 
value chains, lead firms often invest in poorer producers’ assets — an occurrence that 
appears to empower the producer. 
 
However, it is important to note that investments in general (i.e. transferable) assets also 
appear to benefit poor producers. Under such circumstances, producers accumulate assets 
that can improve their productive capabilities, irrespective of who makes the investment. 
Overall, producer investments in specific producer assets appear to hurt poor producers, 
while all other forms of investments in producer assets appear to benefit producers to 
varying degrees. 
 
2.2.3. Commodity differentiation 
 
Poor producers can also benefit from participation in value chains built around 
differentiated commodities. There are two principal reasons why this appears to be the 
case. First, value chains for differentiated commodities are characterised by high value final 
markets, which typically offer producers higher economic returns (World Bank 2013, p.49). 
This is achieved either through the production of high value cash crops, or by altering the 
underlying value proposition of a commodity, as is the case with Certified Organic and Fair 
Trade produce (Vorley et al., 2009). Second, the lessons drawn from the dependency 
dynamic as it relates to asset specificity can also be extended to commodity differentiation. 
The greater the degree of commodity differentiation, the fewer competitors producers 
face. Producers are therefore less easily replaced, skewing the dependency dynamic in 
their favour. 
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However, it is important to note that markets for differentiated commodities can have 
prohibitively high operational standards. These health and food safety standards could act 
as barriers to entry for poor producers. Yet overall, the production of more differentiated 
commodities appears to increase the value added by producers, and increase their market 
power vis-à-vis other value chain participants. 
 
2.2.4. Long-run price stability 
 
A commodity’s long-run price stability appears to be crucial to poor producers’ welfare, and 
to the achievement of pro-poor outcomes. This is because unstable prices increase poor 
producers’ exposure to risk. A producer’s decision to join a value chain is contingent on the 
assurance of stability and security (Vorley et al., 2009). Without stable returns, poor 
producers may struggle to meet their consumption needs, and will be incapable of planning 
their future value chain operations (Norell and Brand, 2012). Given the risk-averse nature 
of poor producers, any sudden threat to producer income can undermine their welfare, 
and their ability to remain active in the value chain. While contract schemes may help 
mitigate the risks of volatile prices, any long-term downward pressure on prices is likely to 
be passed on to producers during contract renegotiations. Overall, commodities and 
mechanisms that increase long-run price stability appear to reduce poor producers’ 
exposure to economic risks. 
 
2.2.5. Perishability 
 
A commodity’s perishability has a significant bearing on the terms by which poor producers 
participate in value chains. There are two principal reasons why this appears to be the case. 
First, the production of perishable commodities can skew the distribution of market power 
in favour of downstream actors (World Bank 2013, p.10). The more perishable a 
commodity, the shorter the time-frame in which producers can search for a suitable buyer. 
Buyers can exploit this favourable market position to put downward pressure on prices — 
unfavourable pricing that poor producers may nevertheless be willing to accept, as it is 
preferable to receiving no income whatsoever. Second, the effects of this skewed 
distribution of market power may undermine price stability in a manner similar to that 
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caused by exogenous economic factors (Section 2.2.4). If producers are unable to sustain 
their consumption patterns due to downward pressure on prices for their perishable crops, 
their welfare may be jeopardised. 
 
However, there appear to be a variety of means by which the risks of producing perishable 
crops can be mitigated. Producers can collectively invest in the storage infrastructure 
needed to preserve the commodities. Alternatively, contract schemes provide a 
guaranteed market for producer output, circumventing the issues that arise in trying to sell 
perishable commodities. Overall, despite the possibility for interventions to mitigate 
producers’ risk exposure, increased commodity perishability appears to have a negative 
effect on poor producers’ participation in value chains. 
 
2.2.6. Time horizon and frequency of benefits 
 
A commodity’s time horizon and frequency of benefits are vital poor producers’ welfare, 
and thus to the achievement of pro-poor outcomes. Similar to long-run price stability 
(Section 2.2.4), poor producers’ consumption patterns and risk aversion are of the utmost 
importance. Prolonged periods in which income is not generated are problematic given 
poor producers’ lack of savings. As such, seasonal commodities appear to be less conducive 
to the needs of the poor than those that offer consistent incomes throughout the year. 
Even if seasonal work were to generate a higher net income, the poor have often been 
observed to prioritize income stability due to their particular consumption needs 
(Michelson et al., 2012). Furthermore, given their limited assets, poor producers are also 
unlikely to be willing or able to wait a significant period of time to see a return on their 
investment (Norell and Brand 2012, p. 74). Commodities such as coffee that require several 
years before producing the intended output appear to be much less conducive to the needs 
of the poor. 
 
However, institutional mechanisms can be used to mitigate the risks of producing seasonal 
crops. For instance, investment in storage facilities may allow poor producers to retain a 
portion of their output for out-of-season sale. In doing so, producers would not only 
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generate a more regularised income, but would also be capable of selling their crops at 
what are often higher out-of-season prices. Overall, commodities that do not meet poor 
producers’ needs for regularised income appear to undermine their welfare, and thus the 
achievement of pro-poor outcomes. 
 
2.2.7. Vertical coordination 
 
Vertical coordination can have a significant bearing on poor producers’ participation in 
value chains. This appears to be the case for two principal reasons. First, vertical 
coordination can increase and stabilise poor producers’ access to markets. Through the 
formation of strong vertical linkages, producers can gain access to market demand that can 
absorb their supply. This offers income-generating opportunities that may otherwise not 
have been available. Strong linkages can also stabilise income through price and quantity 
guarantees. Such post-production guarantees can produce mutually beneficial outcomes 
for participating value chain actors. For poor producers this can include increased 
productivity and guaranteed prices. For buyers this can include guaranteed quality, 
quantity, and timing of deliveries. 
 
Second, vertical coordination can provide producers with the inputs needed to participate 
in particular value chains. Poor producers often lack the capital, knowledge, and technology 
necessary to recognise and respond to market signals. Through production contracts, 
downstream actors provide poor producers with these necessary inputs, facilitating their 
participation in the value chain. 
 
However, for vertical coordination to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes, a sensitive 
balance must be found between excess and insufficient competition among buyers. On the 
one hand, if vertical coordination in a value chain is excessive, lead firms will be able to 
abuse their market power to extract a disproportionate level of rents from a value chain. 
On the other hand, if there is excessive competition among buyers, producers may engage 
in opportunistic behaviour, including “side-selling” to a contractor’s rival firms. Where 
producers engage in side-selling, the incentive for contractors to engage directly with 
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producers is undermined, and may cause contracting firms to withdraw their pre-
production guarantees to producers. Overall, greater vertical coordination appears to 
benefit poor producers. Yet beyond a certain threshold, vertical coordination may 
significantly skew the distribution of market power in favour of downstream actors. 
 
2.2.8. Lead firm 
 
In value chains with strong vertical coordination, the type of lead firm — a firm that guides 
the development and management of the value chain (UNIDO, 2009; Bolwig et al., 2008) — 
can have a significant bearing on poor producers’ participation. This is driven by the fact 
that some lead firm configurations appear more willing and capable of offering pre-
production assistance than others. In particular, the size of a lead firm may affect the ability 
to provide poor producers with pre-production assistance (Raswant and Khanna 2010, p. 
13-14; Roduner 2007, p. 12). Smaller firms may be less capable of incurring the short-term 
costs associated with outgrower schemes, and may therefore be less willing to form 
production contracts with poor producers than are large firms and multinationals. Overall, 
it appears that the larger the lead firm, the more likely it may be to provide poor producers 
with the necessary productive inputs. 
 
2.2.9. Horizontal coordination 
 
The degree of horizontal coordination can have an influential impact on poor producers’ 
participation in value chains. This appears to be the case for two principal reasons. First, 
horizontal coordination can reduce transaction costs involved in dealing with other value 
chain participants. Transaction costs can be reduced by empowering poor producers to 
aggregate individual buyer and seller power to achieve collective efficiencies (Raswant and 
Khanna, 2010). For example, the costs of technical or input assistance can be reduced 
through bulk purchasing, while post-harvest aggregation can reduce the transaction costs 
for buyers, enabling producers to negotiate higher prices (World Bank 2013, p.10). 
Additionally, increased horizontal coordination can facilitate information sharing among 
producers regarding best practices, leading to efficiency gains. Second, increased horizontal 
coordination can increase producers’ collective market power (Berg et al. 2006, p. 22). By 
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aggregating their activities, poor producers can transact with other market actors as if 
operating as a single, larger producer. An increase in market power is also driven by the 
pooling of poor producers’ exposure to risk (Norell and Brand 2012, p. 61). Collectively 
exposed to less risk, poor producers are able to make more credible threats when 
negotiating over transactions, and are also more attractive to investors and creditors. 
 
However, horizontal coordination may: (i) contribute to the further marginalisation of poor 
producers who are not linked to the coordinating organisations; and (ii) indirectly harm 
those members of the rural poor engaged in small-scale processing or trading, as well-
organised producers may bypass local value chain intermediaries and sell directly to 
wholesalers. Yet overall, greater horizontal coordination appears to be highly beneficial for 
those poor producers able to participate in producers’ associations. 
 
 
2.2.10. Vertical integration by producers’ associations 
 
Vertical integration by producers’ associations can also have a significant bearing on poor 
producers’ participation in value chains. This appears to be the case for two principal 
reasons. First, vertical integration by producers affects the distribution of rents in a value 
chain. If processing facilities are collectively owned by a targeted group of producers, this is 
likely to increase their share of the total value generated in the value chain (Berg et al. 
2006, p. 39). Second, collective ownership of such facilities would also affect the 
distribution of market power in a value chain. Not only are producers aggregating their 
output, they are also circumventing the need to transact with independent processors. In 
so doing, the product that producers ultimately sell is likely to be more valuable, and 
significantly less perishable. This may increase producers’ negotiating position when 
transacting with buyers, and by extension, their market power. Overall, vertical integration 
by producers’ associations appears to have a positive effect on poor producers’ 
participation in value chains. 
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2.3. Typology: The six principal determinants of pro-poor 
outcomes 
 
For analytical purposes, it is necessary to synthesise these numerous factors into a more 
manageable set of determinants of pro-poor outcomes. Each of these determinants can be 
considered to represent a spectrum of possibilities, rather than an absolute. As one moves 
along these broad spectrums of possibilities, the likelihood of achieving pro-poor outcomes 
increases or decreases, depending on the direction. 
 
This emphasis on the likelihood of producing pro-poor outcomes is absolutely critical. It is 
not possible to definitively say whether a particular arrangement of determinants will or 
will not benefit the poor. As highlighted in the literature review, the connection between 
value chain characteristics and pro-poor outcomes is highly contextual. This makes 
definitive and absolute statements unsubstantiated, and highly problematic. 
 
The six key determinants of the likelihood that value chains will achieve pro-poor outcomes 
are 
 
i. labour intensity 
ii. specificity 
iii. resilience 
iv. perishability 
v. income smoothing 
vi. the governance of linkages 
 
It is important to note that not all of these determinants will necessarily affect pro-poor 
outcomes in each and every value chain project. It is also possible that a particular value 
chain intervention will satisfy pro-poor characteristics of one determinant, while 
simultaneously failing to meet the pro-poor characteristics of another. For instance, while 
the production of cassava is generally quite labour intensive (FAO, 2008), so too does its 
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high perishability (Berg et al., 2006) reduce poor producers’ market power. Ceteris paribus, 
cassava would simultaneously be expected to improve and limit the likelihood of achieving 
pro-poor outcomes. This further highlights the importance of context-specific factors, and 
the weighing of the likely impact of these individual determinants through careful value 
chain analysis. These six determinants are discussed in Table 3. 
 
 
Table 3: Six principal determinants of pro-poor outcomes 
Determinant Description Examples 
Labour intensity A commodity's tendency 
towards labour- or capital-
intensive production. 
Greater labour intensity: cassava, 
cocoa, fruits, vegetables, tobacco, 
Certified Organic 
Greater capital intensity: maize, rice, 
wheat 
Specificity The specificity of producers' 
assets and the degree of 
product differentiation, jointly 
affecting a value chain's 
dependency dynamic. 
More differentiated commodities: 
Certified Organic, Fair Trade, niche 
fruits and vegetables 
More undifferentiated commodities: 
maize, rice, wheat 
Investment in specific producer assets: 
meeting operational standards of a 
given value chain 
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Resilience A commodity's ability to 
withstand exogenous 
environmental and economic 
shocks. 
Environmental resilience: pearl millet, 
sorghum, legumes, cassava 
Environmental vulnerability: maize, 
barley 
Economic resilience: maize, pearl millet 
Economic vulnerability: root crops 
Perishability The time-frame in which a 
commodity's quality 
deteriorates. 
Less perishable: maize, rice, wheat 
More perishable: cassava, yams, 
potatoes, onions 
Income 
smoothing 
A producer's ability to 
generate a stable, year-round 
income. 
Greater income smoothing: honey, 
irrigated crops, fertilisers 
Less income smoothing: coffee, 
seasonal cash crops 
Governance of 
linkages 
The degree of horizontal and 
vertical coordination. 
Pro-poor coordination: limited buyer 
competition, producer cooperation, 
input provision, contractual 
relationships 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
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2.3.1. Labour intensity 
 
The labour intensity of the production process is an important determinant of the 
distribution of the value added within the production segment. The more labour-intensive 
the production process, the greater the demand for labour. Under such circumstances, it is 
likely that income will be distributed more equitably than would otherwise be the case, as 
discussed in Section 2.2.1. This is depicted along the horizontal labour intensity spectrum 
(see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Labour-intensity spectrum 
 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
 
Figure 2 presents labour intensity along a single dimension. Value chains can be positioned 
anywhere along the horizontal axis. A value chain positioned on the right-hand side 
indicates a greater likelihood that a value chain will positively affect poor producers. A 
value chain positioned on the left-hand side indicates the opposite effect. 
 
Right-hand side (+) 
The right-hand side of the spectrum represents commodities characterised by increasingly 
labour-intensive production techniques. The further ones moves in this direction, the 
greater the likelihood that value chains will be conducive to the poor. For example, cash 
crops such as cocoa, tobacco, cassava, fruits and vegetables are often efficiently produced 
using labour-intensive production techniques. 
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Left-hand side (-) 
The left-hand side of the spectrum represents an increasing emphasis on capital-intensive 
agriculture. The further one moves in this direction, the less likely it is that value chains will 
be conducive to the poor. For example, rice and maize are often most efficiently produced 
using capital-intensive production techniques, with a correspondingly marginal impact on 
labour demand. 
 
2.3.2. Specificity 
 
Specificity refers to the degree of differentiation of both a producer’s assets, as well as that 
of the commodity produced. Underlying this determinant of pro-poor outcomes is the 
dependency dynamic discussed in Section 2.2.2 and 2.2.3. The more the dependency 
dynamic favours producers — the more downstream actors are dependent on maintaining 
a production relationship with the target group — the greater the likelihood of achieving 
pro-poor outcomes. 
 
Specifically, investment in specific producer assets could affect the dependency dynamic in 
a range of ways. At one end, investment by a lead firm in specific producer assets is likely 
to increase the lead firm’s dependency on maintaining the production relationship with 
existing producers. At the other end, investment by producers in their own specific assets is 
likely to increase their dependency on maintaining the production relationship with existing 
buyers. This is depicted vertically along the asset specificity spectrum (see Figure 3). 
 
Simultaneously, the production of more differentiated commodities is likely to make 
producers less replaceable, increasing their market power. Such differentiation also has a 
significant impact on the total value added by the chain, and in particular that which is 
added at the production link; more differentiated commodities are typically higher in value 
than their undifferentiated counterparts, with much of this additional value added by 
producers themselves. This is depicted horizontally along the commodity differentiation 
spectrum (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Specificity spectrum 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
 
Figure 3 presents two dimensions of specificity that affect the likelihood of achieving pro-
poor outcomes. Value chains can be positioned anywhere on either the vertical or 
horizontal axes. A value chain positioned closer to the top-right corner indicates a greater 
likelihood that a value chain will positively affect poor producers. A value chain positioned 
in the bottom-left corner indicates the opposite effect. 
 
Top-right quadrant (+) 
The top-right quadrant represents the production of relatively differentiated commodities 
(x-axis) and lead firm investment in specific producer assets (y-axis). A positioning in this 
quadrant indicates the highest likelihood of achieving pro-poor outcomes. For example, 
production of Fair Trade coffee, with a lead firm investing in producers’ capacities to meet 
the operational standards of the value chain. 
 
Top-left quadrant (-/+) 
The top-left quadrant represents the production of relatively undifferentiated commodities 
(x-axis) and lead firm investment in specific producer assets (y-axis). A chain positioned in 
this quadrant may achieve pro-poor outcomes. For example, production of medium-grade 
apples destined for export markets, with a lead firm investing in producers’ capacities to 
meet the operational standards of the value chain. 
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Bottom-right quadrant (+/-) 
The bottom-right quadrant represents the production of differentiated commodities (x-
axis) and producer investment in specific producer assets (y-axis). Once again, a chain 
positioned in this quadrant may achieve pro-poor outcomes. For example, production of 
high-grade livestock, which may involve producer investment in meeting food safety 
standards. 
 
Bottom-left quadrant (-) 
The bottom-left quadrant represents the production of undifferentiated commodities (x-
axis) and producer investment in specific producer assets (y-axis). A chain positioned in this 
quadrant is unlikely to achieve pro-poor outcomes. For example, production of spinach, 
which may involve producer investment in specific assets to meet food safety standards 
relating to e-coli. 
 
 
2.3.3. Resilience 
 
Resilience focuses first and foremost on producer income. Protecting poor producers’ 
incomes is of the utmost importance given their general lack of savings with which to 
cushion themselves from exogenous shocks (Norell and Brand, 2012). This income is 
contingent on maintaining a consistent level of output, and on preventing the price of the 
producer’s output from falling, as discussed in Sections 2.2.4 and 2.2.6. There are two types 
of exogenous shock that could threaten producer incomes. 
 
The first threat is via environmental shock. A drought that decimates a producer’s output 
will significantly undermine his/her income, particularly in those regions that lack (or 
possess underdeveloped) crop insurance schemes. A commodity’s vulnerability to water 
stress — or any other exogenous environmental shock — will therefore have a significant 
impact on efforts to reduce poverty (World Bank, 2013). This is depicted horizontally along 
the environmental resilience spectrum (see Figure 4). 
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The second threat is via economic shock. The resilience of a commodity’s price in the face 
of economic shock — resilience typically derived from a high elasticity of demand — can 
have a significant bearing on the stability of a producer’s income. Commodities prone to 
price volatility may limit a value chain’s pro-poor potential. This is depicted vertically along 
the economic resilience spectrum (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: Resilience spectrum 
 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
 
Figure 4 presents two dimensions of resilience that affect the likelihood of achieving pro-
poor outcomes. Value chains can be positioned anywhere on either the vertical or 
horizontal axes. A value chain positioned closer to the top-right corner indicates a greater 
likelihood of positively affecting poor producers. A value chain positioned in the bottom-
left corner indicates the opposite effect. 
 
Top-right quadrant (+) 
The top-right quadrant represents the production of economically resilient (y-axis), and 
environmentally resilient (x-axis) commodities. A value chain situated in this quadrant is 
likely to achieve pro-poor outcomes. For example, pearl millet is both drought resistant, 
and possesses a high elasticity of demand. 
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Top-left quadrant (-/+) 
The top-left quadrant represents the production of environmentally vulnerable (x-axis), yet 
economically resilient (y-axis) commodities. A value chain situated in this quadrant may 
achieve pro-poor outcomes. For example, maize is typically vulnerable to drought (Barratt 
et al., 2006), yet has a high elasticity of demand due to its use as cattle feed, among others. 
 
Bottom-right quadrant (+/-) 
The bottom-right quadrant represents the production of environmentally resilient (x-axis), 
yet economically vulnerable (y-axis) commodities. Once again, a value chain situated in this 
quadrant may achieve pro-poor outcomes. For example, cassava is typically drought 
resistant (Barratt et al., 2006), yet may be prone to fluctuations in price due to its high 
perishability. 
 
Bottom-left quadrant (-) 
The bottom-left quadrant represents the production of environmentally vulnerable (x-axis) 
and economically vulnerable (y-axis) commodities. A value chain situated in this quadrant 
has a low likelihood of achieving pro-poor outcomes. For example, coffee is reasonably 
vulnerable to drought (Cheserek and Gichimu, 2012), and may be susceptible to price 
variability due to its limited non-food uses. 
 
2.3.4. Perishability 
 
A commodity’s perishability is an important determinant of the distribution of market 
power in a value chain, and can ultimately undermine the stability of producer income. 
When asset-poor producers lack adequate storage capacity, the production of perishable 
commodities may limit their bargaining power at the point of sale. As discussed in Section 
2.2.5, this may empower downstream actors to drive down prices during the negotiation 
process. This is depicted horizontally along the perishability spectrum (see 
Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: Perishability spectrum 
 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
 
 
Figure 5 presents perishability on a single dimension as it relates to the achievement of 
pro-poor outcomes. Value chains can be positioned anywhere along the horizontal axis. A 
value chain positioned on the right-hand side indicates a greater likelihood of positively 
affecting poor producers. A value chain positioned on the left-hand side indicates the 
opposite effect. 
 
Right-hand side (+) 
The right-hand side of the spectrum represents the production of less perishable 
commodities. A value chain situated on this side of the spectrum is more likely to achieve 
pro-poor outcomes. For example, staple crops such as maize, rice and wheat can be 
preserved for extended periods of time. 
 
Left-hand side (-) 
The left-hand side of the spectrum represents the production of more perishable 
commodities. A value chain situated on this side of the spectrum is less likely to achieve 
pro-poor outcomes. For example, root crops such as cassava, potatoes and yams are 
particularly perishable. Unless sold for processing, cassava typically rots within 2-3 days 
after harvest (Berg et al., 2006). 
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2.3.5. Income smoothing 
 
Smoothing a poor producer’s income is of vital importance to achieving substantive pro-
poor outcomes in value chain interventions. This demographic’s vulnerability makes them 
more dependent on receiving a stable and consistent income with which to purchase basic 
necessities (Norell and Brand, 2012). As discussed in Section 2.2.6, commodities that 
generate stable income throughout the year are more conducive to meeting poor 
producers’ needs. In those value chains in which the commodity is not conducive to the 
poor’s needs, various other mechanisms and institutions can be employed to smoothen 
producer incomes. This is depicted horizontally along the income smoothing spectrum (see 
Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6: Income smoothing spectrum 
 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
 
Figure 6 presents income smoothing on a single dimension as it relates to the achievement 
of pro-poor outcomes. Value chains can be positioned anywhere along the horizontal axis. 
A value chain positioned on the right-hand side indicates a greater likelihood that a value 
chain will positively affect poor producers. A value chain positioned on the left-hand side 
indicates the opposite effect. 
 
Right-hand side (+) 
The right-hand side of the spectrum represents a stronger capacity to smoothen producer 
income, either due to commodity-specific or institutional factors. A value chain situated on 
this side of the spectrum has a higher likelihood of achieving pro-poor outcomes. For 
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example, honey is conducive to year-round production, given a suitable climate. In the 
absence of such income-smoothing commodities, mechanisms such as outgrower schemes 
can similarly smooth producer income. 
 
Left-hand side (-) 
The left-hand side of the spectrum represents a weaker capacity to smoothen producer 
income. A value chain situated on this side of the spectrum is less likely to achieve pro-poor 
outcomes. For example, coffee can take up to five years after the initial planting before 
producing a harvestable crop (Norell and Brand 2012, p. 74) — a time lag that stagnates, 
rather than smooths producer income. 
 
2.3.6. Governance of linkages 
 
The means by which market linkages are governed can have a significant impact on the 
poor’s participation in value chains, and the terms by which this participation occurs. 
Governance structures can also compensate for a lack of pro-poor characteristics in the 
typology’s other key determinants. Pivotal to this are the effects of vertical and horizontal 
coordination. 
 
The means by which market linkages are governed can have a significant impact on the 
poor’s participation in value chains, and the terms by which this participation occurs. 
Governance structures can also compensate for a lack of pro-poor characteristics in the 
typology’s other key determinants. Pivotal to this are the effects of vertical and horizontal 
coordination. 
 
As discussed in Section 2.2.7, increased levels of vertical coordination can offer significant 
benefits for the poor. Vertical coordination can result in: (i) increased and stable access to 
markets; and (ii) pre-production assistance.  Yet beyond a certain level, vertical 
coordination can grant buyers significant market power. This is depicted vertically along the 
vertical coordination spectrum (see Figure 7). 
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As discussed in Section 2.2.8, increased levels of horizontal coordination can also be 
beneficial for the poor. Horizontal coordination can result in: (i) reduced transaction costs 
when dealing with buyers; (ii) the aggregation of purchasing power, and (iii) increased 
market power for producers. The latter can be particularly beneficial in chains with high 
degrees of vertical coordination, and serve as a means of mitigating the accumulation of 
excess market power in the hands of buyers. This is depicted horizontally along the 
horizontal coordination spectrum (see Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7: Governance of linkages spectrum 
 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
* Increased vertical coordination is beneficial up to a certain point. Beyond this point, net 
benefits for producers are likely to decline as buyers accumulate excessive market power. 
 
Figure 7 presents two dimensions of linkage governance that affect the likelihood of 
achieving pro-poor outcomes. Value chains can be positioned anywhere on either the 
vertical or horizontal axes. A value chain positioned closer to the top-right corner indicates 
a greater likelihood that a value chain will positively affect poor producers. A value chain 
positioned in the bottom-left corner indicates the opposite effect. 
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Top-right quadrant (+) 
The top-right quadrant represents a value chain with strong horizontal coordination (x-axis) 
and strong vertical coordination (y-axis). A value chain situated in this quadrant has the 
highest likelihood of achieving pro-poor outcomes. For example, a value chain vertically 
coordinated using contract schemes, and in which producers are organised into strong 
producers’ associations. 
 
Top-left quadrant (-/+) 
The top-left quadrant represents a value chain with weak horizontal coordination (x-axis), 
and strong vertical coordination (y-axis). A value chain situated in this quadrant may 
achieve pro-poor outcomes. For example, a value chain vertically coordinated using 
outgrower schemes, and in which fragmented producers compete for the limited number 
of contract positions. 
 
Bottom-right quadrant (+/-) 
The bottom-right quadrant represents a value chain with strong horizontal coordination (x-
axis) and weak vertical coordination (y-axis). Once again, a value chain situated in this 
quadrant may achieve pro-poor outcomes. For example, a spot market-based value chain 
operating largely on the basis of price signals, and in which producers cooperate 
extensively through strong producers’ associations. 
 
Bottom-left quadrant (-) 
The bottom-left quadrant represents a value chain with weak horizontal coordination (x-
axis) and weak vertical coordination (y-axis). A value chain situated in this quadrant is 
unlikely to achieve pro-poor outcomes. For example, a spot market-based value chain 
operating on price signals, in which many fractured producers compete to supply an array 
of buyers. 
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Chapter Three 
 
 
The following chapter is intended to illustrate the explanatory power of the typology. In 
particular, this chapter attempts to demonstrate how the typology could be applied during 
the analysis and design stages of a value chain intervention to develop projections as to 
their likelihood of achieving pro-poor outcomes. This is done with the expectation that 
such projections, and by extension the typology itself, will be tested through future field-
based research. 
 
The typology developed in this document is an instrument in development. While it could 
eventually be used to guide project design, it should first be tested using current value 
chain projects. This process of testing the typology’s explanatory power is not intended to 
test its validity, but rather to identify and improve its usefulness. Such testing represents 
the next step in building this useful analytical tool, which can be used to guide future value 
chain projects so as to achieve the most substantive pro-poor outcomes possible. 
 
This chapter is structured around three sections. First, the chapter presents a matrix of 
eight IFAD value chain projects. The purpose of this matrix is to provide an indication of the 
extent to which the design of these particular projects address and mention the 
determinants of pro-poor outcomes established in the typology. The second and third 
sections explore the Vegetable Oil Development Project, Phase 2 in Uganda and the Pro-
Poor Value Chain Development Project in Mozambique in greater detail. These projects 
were chosen because of their greater availability of information against which to apply the 
typology. The purpose of these sections is to demonstrate how the typology could be 
applied to develop hypotheses regarding their likelihood of achieving pro-poor outcomes. 
While we are constrained in our ability to do so, the expectation is that the validity of 
these, or similar hypotheses could later be tested through interim evaluations and 
household-level impact assessments (see Appendix). 
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3.1. IFAD project designs 
 
This section examines the extent to which eight IFAD value chain project designs consider 
the factors identified in the typology. A preliminary list of value chain interventions was 
created using Raswant and Khanna (2010) and Hartmann and Hamp (forthcoming). Projects 
that had been completed were excluded so as not to bias our hypotheses. This list was 
further reduced due to the limited availability of detailed Project Design reports. Given the 
non-random selection process and small sample size, the aim of the matrix is to give a 
limited indication of the present consideration given to the typologies factors in what are 
assumed to be IFAD’s more detailed project designs. The matrix does not intend to draw 
inferences to any other IFAD value chain projects. 
 
 
Matrix 1: Attention given to typology characteristics in eight IFAD Value Chain Project 
Designs (1= Not addressed and not mentioned; 2= Addressed, but not mentioned; 3= 
Addressed and mentioned) 
 
Programme/Project Labour 
intensity 
Specificity Resilience Perishability Income 
smoothing 
Governance 
of linkages 
Vegetable Oil 
Development 
Project – Phase 2 
(Uganda) 
2 2 2 3 2 2 
Value Chain 
Development 
Programme 
(Nigeria) 
2 1 1 3 1 1 
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Source: Authors’ compilation, based on IFAD, 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; 2011c; 2012a; 2012b; 
2012c; 2012d) 
Upper Tana 
Catchment Natural 
Resource 
Management 
Project (Kenya) 
1 1 3 3 1 1 
Smallholder 
Productivity 
Promotion 
Programme 
(Zambia) 
3 2 3 2 1 2 
Women’s 
Empowerment and 
Livelihoods 
Programme in the 
Mid-Gangetic Plains 
(India) 
3 2 2 3 2 1 
Jharkhand Tribal 
Empowerment and 
Livelihood Project 
(India) 
2 1 3 3 1 1 
Mitigating Poverty 
in Western 
Rajasthan Project 
(India) 
1 2 3 3 1 2 
Pro-poor Value 
Chain Development 
Project in the 
Maputo and 
Limpopo Corridor 
(Mozambique) 
2 2 3 3 2 2 
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3.2. Vegetable Oil Development Project - Phase 2 (Uganda) 
 
 
Box 1: Vegetable Oil Development Project - Phase 2 project figures 
 
Source: IFAD project webpage 
 
 
3.2.1. Project design and objectives 
 
The aim of Vegetable Oil Development Project Phase 2 is to raise incomes for the rural poor 
in Uganda and ensure the supply of affordable vegetable oil products to domestic and 
export markets. To achieve this, the project objective is to increase the domestic 
production of vegetable oil and its by-products (IFAD 2010c, p.xii). The project is divided 
into three components: (i) oil palm development (81 per cent of total budget); (ii) oilseed 
development (13 per cent of total budget); and (iii) project management (6 per cent of 
total budget). 
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Map 1: Geographic location of Vegetable Oil Development Project, Phase 2 activities 
 
Source: Google Maps 
 
Component one focuses on increasing oil palm production along Uganda’s Lake Victoria 
shoreline. At the core of the component’s design is the consolidation and expansion of a 
public-private partnership model developed previously on the Bugala Island, which brought 
together an integrated producer-buyer lead firm, established a producer association to 
support smallholder participation, and public sector oversight. In this second phase project, 
the component focuses first on increasing smallholder production of oil palm in the 
Kalangala district of Bugala Island from 2,000ha to 4,700ha. This will be supported with the 
strengthening of the pre-existing Kalangala Oil Palm Growers Trust (KOPGT) and the 
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development of a ferry service from the Bugala Island to the mainland. Second, the 
component aims to create a 10,000ha oil palm development on Buvuma Island, with 
3,500ha cultivated by smallholder producers and 6,500ha directly operated by Oil Palm 
Uganda Limited (OPUL). This activity will be supported by the creation of Buvuma Oil Palm 
Growers Trust (BOPGT) and the creation of ferry services. The component expects to 
directly improve the incomes of 3,000 smallholder producers and indirectly benefit an 
unquantified number of wage labourers (IFAD 2010c, p.xii). 
 
Diagram 2: Governance structure of oil palm component 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on IFAD, 2010c 
 
Component two focuses on increasing Uganda’s production of sunflower, soybean, sesame 
and groundnut oilseed crops. Production of oilseed crops will focus on four economic hubs: 
three in Northern Uganda and one in Eastern Uganda. The hubs are intended to serve 
domestic and export markets, with demand expected to exceed the estimated increase in 
supply. The component’s activities will focus on increasing research and design into 
improved/hybrid seed varieties, provide support in contracting extension services for 
roughly 5,900 producer associations, provide financial support for an industry wide 
platform — the Oilseeds Sub-sector Platform (OUSSP) — and provide a risk mitigation fund 
for participating financial institutions. The component will target 136,000 poor rural 
producer, processor and trader households (IFAD 2010c, p.xii). 
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Diagram 3: Governance structure of oilseed component 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on IFAD, 2010c 
 
3.2.2. Application of the typology 
 
The following analysis explores how the typology can be applied to the analysis and design 
of oil palm and oilseed value chain development in Uganda to hypothesise the project’s 
likelihood of achieving pro-poor outcomes. 
 
Labour intensity 
 
The labour intensity of the oil palm and oilseed crops are not explicitly referenced in either 
the phase 2 project design or phase 1 interim evaluation. However, the “high” priority 
given to increasing input intensity implies a reduction in the proportional intensity of 
labour to capital (IFAD 2010c, Appendix 4 p.9). This is motivated by the shortage of labour 
identified as a cause for the slow development in particular of oil palm production (IFAD 
2010c, p.5; IFAD 2011b, p.16). 
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While the project documents do not explicitly reference the labour intensity of oil palm and 
oilseed crop production, both are considered highly labour intensive (World Bank, 2013; 
Vermeulen and Goad, 2006; FAO, 2001). UNEP calculate that one oil palm worker is 
required for every 2.3ha (2011, p.5). Furthermore, the ban on the use of herbicides in the 
production of oilseed crops (IFAD 2010c, p.9) means that a level of labour intensity is 
maintained. 
 
Overall, while little explicit attention is given to the labour intensity of oil palm and oilseed 
crop production, the issue of labour availability and naturally labour-intensive means of 
production ensure that both oil palm and oilseed production would be expected to 
positively contribute to pro-poor outcomes. Furthermore, this project supports the work of 
Ngeleza and colleagues (2011) who show that in certain contexts an emphasis on capital 
intensity (via input intensity) can facilitate pro-poor outcomes. 
 
Specificity 
 
The project documents make no explicit reference to asset specificity. However, the lack of 
asset ownership is considered a key factor contributing to poverty in Uganda (IFAD 2010c, 
p.5). Consequently, the project aims to improve asset ownership for 50 per cent of 
participating households (IFAD 2010c, Appendix 5 p.1). These improvements will be 
achieved through the contracting of the private sector, to provide inputs and extension 
services, facilitated by producers’ associations (IFAD 2010c, p.23). This is considered a 
“high” priority for the project (IFAD 2010c, Appendix 4 p.6-7). While the project documents 
do not explicitly reference asset specificity, the high reliance on labour should enable 
producers to easily switch labour and other inputs to different crops (Vermeulen and Goad, 
2006). 
 
Similarly, the project documents do not explicitly consider commodity differentiation. The 
focus of the development of a range of vegetable oil products highlights the substitutability 
of these commodities. However, the negative effects of the commodity substitutability are 
partially mitigated by two factors. First, the project supports compliance with high 
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environmental standards for Ugandan oil palm production (IFAD 2010c, Appendix 5 p.1; 
IFAD 2011b, p.75). This may differentiate it from alternative oil palm production, which 
often involves extensive deforestation
12
. Second, the project documents are confident that 
the excess demand for vegetable oil in domestic and export markets would more than 
absorb the additional vegetable oil production (IFAD 2010c, p.8). Given excess demand, 
consumers would not be expected to exercise their ability to substitute the different 
vegetable oil commodities and should ensure that this should not affect the value chain. 
 
Overall, the asset and commodity specificity factors should have a negligible effect on 
achieving pro-poor outcomes given the high dependence on labour and the existence of 
excess demand. 
 
Resilience 
 
Environmental resilience is explicitly and extensively emphasised. Less fertile soils and 
variable rainfall are identified as a constraint for the development and sustainability of 
vegetable oil value chains (IFAD 2010c, Appendix 4 p.2; IFAD 2011b, p.xii). In particular, the 
project identifies financial institutions’ lack of experience in managing commercial risk 
associated with the effect of variable rainfall on oilseed production as a primary barrier to 
the extension of credit (IFAD 2010c, p.xii). Similarly, the decline in soil fertility is identified 
as a cause of pressure on the availability of land, which is exacerbated by the reluctance of 
smallholder producers to use fertilisers (IFAD 2010c, p.38). Extensive environmental risk-
mitigation measures are included in the project’s design. For oil palm production, these 
include a 200 metre forest border along the lakeshore, a zero-burning zone, a ban on the 
use of herbicides and planting of cover crops to prevent soil erosion, minimum use of agro-
chemicals, effluent tanks to treat waste from the palm oil mill, and waste materials 
removed from the palms (IFAD 2010c, p.9). The costs of monitoring compliance will be 
assumed largely by government agencies and an Impact Monitoring System, supported by 
self-conducted environmental compliance audits (IFAD 2010c, p.9). 
                                                          
12
 Since 2004, the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil has certified environmentally responsible oil 
palm production, while the two largest oil palm producing economies - Malaysia and Indonesia - 
have established national certification schemes (European Union Delegation to Malaysia, 2012) 
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Economic resilience is implied extensively throughout the project documents. More 
specifically, it is considered to have substantially improved due to the reduction in civil 
strife, stabilisation of the macroeconomic environment, increased public fiscal prudence 
and market liberalisation (IFAD 2010c, p.3). The project emphasises the harvesting of fresh 
fruit bunches of oil palm. However, given their high perishability and ease of bruising, fresh 
fruit bunches of oil palm must be processed within 24 hours of harvesting (Vermeulen and 
Goad, 2006, p.8). This substantially reduces producers’ market power. With respect to 
oilseed production, the continued isolation and fragmentation of poor rural households 
undermines the benefits resulting from the improved macroeconomic context. 
Furthermore, the dependence on local markets increases oilseed producers’ exposure to 
price volatility (IFAD 2010c, p.3). To overcome these constraints, the project will support 
improved market linkages with support for infrastructure and intermediary value chain 
participants, and increase access to export markets (IFAD 2010c, Appendix 5, p.1).  The 
emphasis on intermediaries should improve the economic resilience of value chain 
linkages, by facilitating aggregation (bulk marketing), quality assurance, financing, and risk 
sharing (IFAD 2010c, p.19). 
 
Overall, the precautions taken to improve environmental resilience should facilitate pro-
poor outcomes. However, given the significant risk to economic resilience associated with 
OPUL’s market power, the vast extent of the oilseed value chain (100,000km2 and 12 
million people), and the assumption that world prices will remain stable (IFAD 2010c, 
Appendix 5), the net effect on the resilience of poor rural households’ incomes may be 
negligible. 
 
Perishability 
 
The project documents make no explicit reference to the perishability of either oil palm or 
oilseed output. While consideration is given to the need to improve the quality of long-
term storage facilitates, this reflects concerns due to pest infestations rather than the need 
to prevent oil palm or oilseed commodities spoiling (IFAD 2010c, Appendix 4 p.3). 
Nevertheless, both oil palm and oilseed crops are highly perishable and liable to bruise 
61 
 
easily. Consequently, the high exposure to risk of producers reduces their market power, 
favouring large value chain participants who are better able to absorb losses. 
 
Regarding oil palm, the project explicitly refers to the harvesting of oil palm as fresh fruit 
bunches. Fresh fruit bunches must be processed within 24 hours of  harvesting to prevent 
enzymes from causing the fruit to deteriorate (Vermeulen and Goad, 2006). Oilseed 
varieties are similarly perishable prior to crushing and refining (i.e. processing). However, 
as they are not traded as fresh fruit bunches, they can be dried on a small-scale near the 
farm gate reducing the risk of post-harvest losses, but increasing dependence on 
processing actors (Schmidt, 1999). 
 
Overall, the highly perishable nature of oil palm and oilseed crops mean that producers risk 
significant post-harvest losses. 
 
Income smoothing  
 
The volatility of prices is explicitly considered in the project documents. With respect to oil 
palm production, the high level of integration should produce income smoothing effects for 
producers. This is because the contractual arrangements include price guarantees, and the 
contractor should be sufficiently large to absorb short-term price shocks (IFAD 2010c, 
Appendix 4 p.12). Furthermore, the increased access to export markets is expected to 
reduce the volatility arising from local markets (IFAD 2010c, p.16). However, the project 
explicitly recognises that the latter is premised on the assumption that international prices 
will remain constant (IFAD 2010c, Appendix 5  p.1). 
 
With respect to oilseed production, income smoothing effects are expected to result from 
improved market information flows facilitated by increased use of mobile phone devices 
and improved value chain linkages (IFAD 2010c, Appendix p.11). Second, the project 
proposes exploring contract price arrangements between millers and farmers to further 
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address the volatility of prices and improve market information services (IFAD 2010c, 
Appendix p.12). 
 
Overall, the project places significantly greater emphasis on the income generating aspect 
of oil palm and oilseed value chain development, rather than their income smoothing 
effects. While there is cause for concern regarding the seasonality and volatility of income, 
these effects can be compensated for by sufficiently responsive producers’ associations. 
 
Governance of linkages 
 
Both project components explicitly and extensively consider the governance of their 
respective value chain linkages. However, the value chain governance structures adopted 
by the two components are very different. 
 
The oil palm development explicitly utilises a vertically integrated model (IFAD 2010c, p.8). 
Given labour shortages, high product substitutability, lack of product differentiation, and 
high perishability of oil palm the project has utilised a tightly integrated model based on a 
public-private partnership to link island based producers with final markets (IFAD 2010c, 
p.4). The oil palm value chain in Uganda is consequently dominated by a fully integrated 
buyer, Oil Palm Uganda Limited. OPUL is a public-private partnership, 90 per cent privately 
owned by Bidco Uganda Ltd (IFAD 2010c, Appendix 3 p.13). Eventually, OPUL expect to 
directly manage 26,500ha of an oil palm plantation, with smallholder producers cultivating 
13,500ha (IFAD 2010c, p.17). To address this imbalance in market power, the project aims 
to strengthen coordination between producers through two producers’ associations: 
Kalangala and Buvuma Oil Palm Growers Trusts (IFAD 2010c, p.15-6). The lack of alternative 
suppliers for OPUL and buyers for producers limits the ability for either side to defect, and 
creates a mutually dependent relationship (IFAD 2010c, p.18). 
 
In contrast the oilseed component explicitly emphasises a spot market governance 
structure. The spot market governance structure is considered the most appropriate model 
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to overcome the transactions costs resulting from the fragmented and segregated 
structure of the oilseed value chain (IFAD 2010c, p.19). By establishing a highly dynamic 
governance structure responsive to price signals, intermediary actors are encouraged to 
establish competitive, commercial links with producers that enable oilseed products to find 
final markets (IFAD 2010c, p.19). In this value chain intervention many producers, 
processors and traders interact in the process of moving oilseed commodities from pre-
production to final market through one of four regional hubs. However, the emphasis 
placed on this dynamic and competitive governance structure risks side-selling by 
producers (IFAD 2010c, Appendix 4 p.13). This undermines the trust in commercial 
relationships necessary for poor producers to access input and credit provisions. As such, 
the value chain stops somewhat short of a full spot market governance structure. While 
numerous producers, processors, traders, and others respond largely to price signals, 
representative associations of the different value chain segments participate in an industry 
wide forum that facilitates some level of coordination for the value chain (IFAD 2010c, 
p.19). 
 
3.2.3. Project hypothesis 
 
H0: Vegetable Oil Development Project, Phase 2 will produce pro-poor outcomes 
(see Table 4) 
 
In summary, the Vegetable Oil Development Project, Phase 2 would be expected to produce 
pro-poor outcomes. The main factors contributing to pro-poor outcomes include: (i) the 
high degree of labour intensity required for the production of both oil palm and oilseed 
crops; (ii) the excess demand in domestic and export markets for vegetable oil products 
and byproducts; (iii) support given to developing horizontal and vertical coordination for 
the support of complementary services, such as credit provision, input and technical 
assistance, and information flows; and (iv) greater integration of Ugandan oil palm and 
oilseed producers into export markets. These positive factors are likely to overcome the 
negative factors, which include: (i) the high degree of commodity substitutability for both 
oil palm and oilseed crops; (ii) high degree of perishability; (iii) environmental shocks, such 
as flooding and droughts; and (iv) the volatility of local market prices. However, the 
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monopsonistic market position of Oil Palm Uganda Limited is cause for concern. While the 
development of the Kalangala and Bugala Oil Palm Growers Trusts is expected to mitigate 
the excessive dependence of producers, this must be closely monitored to ensure that 
future developments do not lead to an abuse of market power. 
 
3.3. Pro-Poor Value Chain Development Project in the Maputo and 
Limpopo Corridor (Mozambique) 
 
 
Box 2: Pro-Poor Value Chain Development Project in the Maputo and Limpopo Corridor 
project figures 
 
Source: IFAD project webpage 
 
3.3.1. Project design and objectives 
 
IFAD’s Pro-Poor Value Chain Development Project in the Maputo and Limpopo Corridor in 
Mozambique is geared towards using commercial development to sustainably increase the 
incomes of the target group: the economically active rural poor, with a particular focus on 
women. The project is geographically situated in Mozambique’s southern region, consisting 
of the provinces of Gaza, Inhambane, and Maputo. This region is considered to be highly 
vulnerable to drought, as well as to climate change. As a result, improving the target 
group’s ability to adapt to climate change is also one of the project’s key goals. To this end, 
the project’s overall approach is considered to be a synthesis of its many underpinnings, 
including 
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i. The value chain approach 
ii. A private sector-driven approach 
iii. Market linkages 
iv. Improved access to services 
v. Increased sustainability of farmers’ organisations 
vi. Increased economic returns to farmers 
 
According to its design report (IFAD, 2012c), the project is comprised of five key 
components, focused on developing horticulture, cassava and red meat value chains, as 
well as financial services, and institutional support and project management. These are 
briefly summarised below. 
 
Map 2: Geographic location of Pro-poor Value Chain Development Project in Maputo and 
Limpopo Corridor activities 
 
Source: Google maps 
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Component one is geared towards developing horticultural value chains in 9 of the 19 
target districts. Its principal aim is to promote horticulture value chains in areas that 
possess underutilised irrigation infrastructure. This involves: (i) promoting year-round 
vegetable production through investments in irrigation, and increasing the target group’s 
access to existing irrigation infrastructure (IFAD 2012c Annex 4, p. 4-8); (ii) developing 
linkages between smallholders and other value chain stakeholders through outgrower 
schemes, as well as horticulture service hubs co-owned by the target group (IFAD 2012c 
Annex 4, p. 9-17); and (iii) developing a favourable value chain environment through multi-
stakeholder platforms (IFAD 2012c Annex 4, p. 17-19). 
 
Diagram 4: Governance structure of horticulture component 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on IFAD 2012c 
 
Component two is geared towards developing cassava value chains in 6 of the project’s 19 
target districts. Its principal aim is to commercially reorientate the target group’s currently 
subsistence-based production of cassava. This involves: (i) developing cassava farmers’ 
ability to sustainably increase their productivity and improve the environmental resilience 
of their production, achieved in part through the development and proliferation of high-
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yield, drought-resistant varieties (IFAD 2012c, p. 16); (ii) developing linkages between 
smallholder producers and other value chain actors, achieved in part through the 
establishment of cassava service hubs that possess processing capabilities (IFAD 2012c, p. 
15); and (iii) developing a favourable value chain environment via multi-stakeholder 
platforms. 
 
Diagram 5: Governance structure of cassava component 
 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on IFAD 2012c 
 
Component three is geared towards developing red meat value chains in 7 of the project’s 
19 target districts. Its principal aim is to increase and commercialise the poor producers’ 
livestock rearing activities (IFAD 2012c, p. 17). This involves: (i) fostering production 
practices that are both profitable and climate resilient, enabled by the formation of strong 
livestock producers’ organisations (LPOs) (IFAD 2012c, p. 18); (ii) ensuring sustained market 
access for producers at fair prices, achieved in part through cattle fairs, the development of 
Meat Traders’ Organisations, and the establishment of a slaughterhouse co-owned by the 
target group (IFAD 2012c, p. 19; Annex 4, p. 38); and (iii) developing a favourable value 
chain environment through multi-stakeholder platforms. 
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Diagram 6: Governance structure of red meat component 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on IFAD 2012c 
 
The principal aim of component four is to ensure that all value chain participants — the 
target group, larger producers, and downstream actors such as processors and distributors 
— have access to adequate financial services at an appropriate cost (IFAD 2012c, p. 19-20). 
While larger and more commercialised value chain participants may already have access to 
the necessary financial services, this does not hold true for the project’s target group, 
among others. As a result, satisfying this project component will involve extending 
resources to existing microfinance institutions (MFIs) through an investment fund, thereby 
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allowing these MFIs to provide the range of financial services required by the value chains’ 
participants. 
 
The principal aim of this component five is to improve the capacities of CEPAGRI — the 
government agency that will implement and manage the project.  This will involve 
improving the agency’s capacity to support value chain development through budgeting, 
administrative and monitoring practices (IFAD 2012c, p. 22). The project will also support 
the agency’s ability to mainstream climate change adaptation strategies both into this 
project, as well as others (IFAD 2012c, p. 22-23). 
3.3.2. Application to the Typology 
 
In reading through the project design report (IFAD 2012c), it is possible to use the typology 
as the basis for analysing the project’s pro-poor potential. Based on the project’s 
components and special considerations, one can discern their effects on the ‘determinants 
of pro-poor outcomes’ highlighted in the typology. 
 
Labour intensity 
 
The project design report pays only marginal attention to the labour intensity of the chosen 
commodities. This focus is limited to the horticulture value chains, with the report 
highlighting their labour intensity as justification for the horticulture component’s inclusion 
in the project (IFAD 2012c, p. 10). The World Bank calculates that  horticulture requires 3-5 
times more labour per hectare than traditional smallholder agriculture (2013, p.20) In 
contrast to horticulture, neither the labour intensity of cassava nor livestock — the two 
other commodities targeted by this project — are discussed in the project design report. 
However, both also involve relatively labour-intensive production techniques (FAO, 2008; 
World Bank, 2013). Given the large surplus of rural labour in Mozambique’s southern 
provinces — those targeted by the project — this increases the likelihood that the project 
will achieve substantive pro-poor outcomes. Overall, the commodities around which this 
project is built are reasonably labour intensive. 
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Specificity 
 
Neither commodity differentiation nor asset specificity are explicitly mentioned in the 
project design report. However, livestock and horticulture output can possess a reasonably 
high level of differentiation, as output quality can vary substantially. However, the project 
design does not specify the intended output quality, limiting the ability to estimate its 
effects on pro-poor outcomes. 
 
Cassava is a relatively undifferentiated commodity. To compensate for this, the project 
intends to establish a service hub to process cassava in each of the five cassava districts 
(IFAD 2012c Annex 4, p. 24-25). These hubs will be co-owned by cassava producers, and 
possess an annual processing capacity of 7,000t per district (IFAD 2012c, p. 16). 
 
Meanwhile, investments in producer assets are not such that they are expected to have a 
significant impact on the distribution of market power. In addition to the creation of 
cassava service hubs (p. 16), the project will invest in a slaughterhouse to service the red 
meat component — a facility that will be co-owned by LPOs (IFAD 2012c, p. 18). The 
development of irrigation infrastructure in the horticulture component (IFAD 2012c, p. 12-
13) constitutes investment in relatively general assets. These constitute investments in 
general and transferable assets, and are therefore unlikely to affect the value chain’s 
dependency dynamic. 
 
Overall, the degree of asset specificity and commodity differentiation is sufficiently 
insignificant that its impact on the distribution of market power will likely prove negligible. 
Their cumulative effect on the expectation that the project will achieve pro-poor outcomes 
is therefore neutral. 
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Resilience 
 
While increasing environmental resilience is explicitly emphasised in the project design 
report, and serves as one of the project’s principal areas of focus, the development of 
economic resilience is largely ignored. First, the project’s horticulture component seeks to 
increase environmental resilience through the promotion of irrigation infrastructure (IFAD 
2012c, p. 12-13; Annex 4, p. 4) — infrastructure that will allow producers to protect their 
production in a region characterised by erratic rainfall, droughts and high temperatures 
(IFAD 2012c, p. 9). This is liable to have a particularly significant impact given that the 
majority of smallholder farmers in the region are currently dependent on rain-fed 
agriculture, with a mere 9% possessing access to irrigation (IFAD 2012c, p. 8). 
 
The project’s cassava component similarly seeks to reduce vulnerability to environmental 
shock. First and foremost, cassava is widely considered to be an inherently drought-
resistant crop (FAD 2012c Annex 4, p. 21; FAO, 2008; Barrat et al., 2006), and so by its very 
selection should promote more environmentally resilient livelihoods for the target group. 
Building on this, the project commits to develop and proliferate high-yield, drought- and 
disease-resistant varieties of cassava (IFAD 2012c, p. 16). Finally, the project intends to use 
the farmers’ organisations and service hubs to disseminate knowledge and distribute 
inputs needed to develop more resilient crop and soil management practices (IFAD 2012c, 
p. 16; Annex 4, p. 26-27). 
 
Similar precautions are taken in the project’s red meat component. The project design 
report highlights the fact that livestock has historically been a key component of livelihood 
strategies in arid and semi-arid regions (IFAD 2012c, p. 10), including those in which the 
project is set. This resilience is complemented by the use of LPOs to develop climate-
resilient production techniques, and disseminate best practices regarding dry season 
feeding techniques (IFAD 2012c, p. 18; Annex 4, p. 35-36). 
 
Overall, the project places a very strong emphasis on promoting resilience to 
environmental shocks, in particular those caused by climate change — an important 
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development given the target region’s high vulnerability to climate change (IFAD 2012c, p. 
8-9). This significantly increases the expectation that the project will achieve substantive 
pro-poor outcomes. 
 
Perishability 
 
While the project design report pays little explicit attention to the perishability of the 
commodities themselves, each of the three value chain components contains a mechanism 
to improve the output’s preservability. First, the outgrower schemes promoted in all three 
of the project’s value chain components offer a guaranteed final market for commodities 
(IFAD 2012c Annex 4, p. 10). The risks involved in producing perishable commodities are 
thereby reduced, as there is less likelihood that output will rot before reaching market. 
However, the prevalence of such schemes is predicted to be minimal in the cassava 
component (IFAD 2012c, p. 15) — an issue given that cassava is the most perishable of the 
commodities supported by this project (IFAD 2012c Annex 4, p. 21). 
 
Service hubs will play an important role in mitigating the risks associated with the 
perishability of cassava. The processing capacity of these service hubs — hubs that will be 
co-owned by the producers themselves (IFAD 2012c, p. 16) — will serve as a destination for 
producers’ output (IFAD 2012c Annex 4, p. 24). While the project offers few details as to 
the proportion of the target group’s cassava production to be absorbed through the service 
hubs, there are plans to expand cassava processing capacity by a further 6,000t per annum 
in each of the five cassava target districts if needed (IFAD 2012c Annex 4, p. 25). 
 
Similar service hubs will also be developed in the horticulture component, having a 
similarly positive impact on the risks associated with perishability. While not possessing 
processing capacity, these horticulture service hubs will offer both cold and dry storage 
(IFAD 2012c, p. 13; Annex 4, p. 11). Although not explicitly linked to the issue of 
perishability in the project design report, the effect is nevertheless worthy of note. 
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Overall, moderate precautions are taken to reduce the risks associated with producing 
perishable crops. This marginally increases the expectation that the project will achieve  
pro-poor outcomes. 
 
Income smoothing 
 
This project contains a variety of income-smoothing mechanisms. While many of these 
mechanisms are not explicitly categorised as such, the project does seek to provide 
producers with a year-round income (IFAD 2012c, p. 12). To this end, the report also 
mentions the benefits to be derived from serving out-of-season markets (IFAD 2012c, p. 
14). 
 
In the horticulture component, the project seeks to facilitate year-round vegetable 
production. This will be achieved in part through the rehabilitation of 2,100ha of existing 
irrigation schemes (IFAD 2012c, p. 13; Annex 4, p. 4-5). By protecting producers from 
seasonal fluctuations in rainfall and growing conditions, both output and income are 
smoothed. Investments in low-cost greenhouses (IFAD 2012c Annex 4, p. 16), efficient 
water management and adequate storage facilities (IFAD 2012c Annex 4, p. 3) are also 
projected to facilitate year-round production (IFAD 2012c, p. 13). Adding to this is the fact 
that horticulture was itself selected for value chain development due in part to the fact 
that it provides quick and steady returns to producers (IFAD 2012c, p. 10; Annex 4, p. 2). As 
discussed in Section 2.2.6, the time-frame in which asset-poor producers accrue income is 
of the utmost importance. 
 
Across all three of the project’s value chain components, outgrower schemes will also 
smoothen producer income (IFAD 2012c, p. 13, 16-17). By regularising transactions via 
contract, a perpetual assurance of income is institutionalised. Complementing this is the 
project’s commitment to invest in transport infrastructure for all three value chain 
components, ensuring that producers are able to physically access markets throughout the 
year (IFAD 2012c, p. 14; 16). 
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Finally, the project will set up fodder banks
13
 in the red meat component, designed to 
compensate for the scarcity of forage during the dry season (IFAD 2012c, p. 18; Annex 4, p. 
36). By protecting producer incomes from natural variability, fodder banks should promote 
pro-poor outcomes. These fodder banks will be managed and operated by the LPOs (IFAD 
2012c, p. 18). 
 
Overall, significant income smoothing is achieved on behalf of the target group — an 
important consideration given their relative vulnerability (IFAD 2012c, p. 8-9). This 
significantly increases the expectation that the project will achieve substantive pro-poor 
outcomes. 
 
Governance of linkages 
 
The governance of linkages is given ample consideration in the project design report. 
Although not explicitly categorised as a form of ‘horizontal coordination’, the promotion of 
producers’ organisations is a recurring theme throughout all three value chain project 
components. In particular, there is a concerted effort to strengthen existing producers' 
organisations (IFAD 2012c Annex 4, p. 17, 27, 34). This is based on the understanding that 
horizontal coordination allows producers to secure inputs at a lower cost, reduces 
transaction costs, and helps ensure producers receive a fair price for their output (IFAD 
2012c, p. 7). To this end, the project seeks to: (i) strengthen weak farmers’ organisations 
(FOs); (ii) develop FOs’ capacities to act as shareholders in service hubs; (iii) promote 
inclusivity in FOs by ensuring greater participation of women; and (iv) promote water users' 
associations to improve the use and management of irrigation schemes (IFAD 2012c, p. 7; 
p. 16-17). 
 
Second, the project will also promote vertical integration by producers into the processing 
segments of the cassava and livestock value chains. In the cassava component, this will take 
the form of service hubs with processing capacity (IFAD 2012c, p. 15-16; Annex 4, p. 24), 
while in the red meat component this will take the form of a slaughterhouse co-owned by 
                                                          
13
 Storage facilities for livestock feed. 
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LPOs (p. 19). In both cases, producers will retain a significant share of the ownership of 
these facilities, accruing a larger share of the value added by their respective value chains. 
 
Finally, the project promotes outgrower schemes in all three components. This is 
particularly so in the horticulture (p. 13; Annex 4, p. 10) and red meat components (IFAD 
2012c, p. 19; Annex 4, p. 39), as there is thought to be less private sector interest among 
buyers to procure cassava through contract schemes (IFAD 2012c, p. 15). Such contract-
based farming promotes a degree of vertical coordination through which producers gain 
better access to inputs, as well as guaranteed and regularised access to markets. 
 
 
Overall, the project places a strong emphasis on fostering horizontal coordination, as well 
as selective, yet beneficial vertical coordination. This increases the expectation that the 
project will achieve substantive pro-poor outcomes. 
 
 
3.3.3. Project hypothesis 
 
H0: Value Chain Development Project in the Maputo and Limpopo Corridor  
will produce pro-poor outcomes (see Table 4) 
 
In summary, the Value Chain Development Project in the Maputo and Limpopo Corridor 
would be expected to achieve pro-poor outcomes. First, the commodities around which the 
three value chain components are built possess a relatively high degree of labour intensity. 
Second, numerous precautions are taken to protect poor producers from the negative 
effects of climate change, which are otherwise projected to be quite severe in the target 
region. Third, the risks associated with commodity perishability are somewhat reduced 
through the development of market linkages, outgrower schemes and storage capacity. 
Fifth, a variety of mechanisms are put in place to help smooth producer incomes. Finally, 
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horizontal coordination is promoted extensively through the development and 
strengthening of farmers’ organisations, and livestock producers’ organisations. 
Collectively, these traits are expected to offer significant benefits for poor producers by 
increasing their market power, farm gate prices, and access to markets, among others. 
Table 4: Pro-poor potential of value chain projects, scored on a scale of 1-5 (1= 
Detrimental to poor; 5= Beneficial for poor) 
Determinants of 
Pro-Poor 
Outcomes 
Vegetable Oil Development 
Project – Phase 2 (Uganda) 
Pro-poor Value Chain Development 
Project in the Maputo and Limpopo 
Corridor (Mozambique) 
Labour intensity Score: 5 
Reasoning: Production of oilseed 
and oil palm is highly labour 
intensive. Increasing proportion of 
capital to labour to overcome 
labour shortages. 
Score: 4 
Reasoning: Production of horticulture, 
cassava and livestock are all reasonably 
labour intensive. 
Specificity Score: 3 
Reasoning: Minimal investment in 
specific producer assets. Oil palm 
and oilseed as relatively 
substitutable, but excess demand 
may neutralise negative effects. 
Some differentiation may be 
achieved through environmental 
standards. 
Score: 2 
Reasoning: Minimal investment in 
specific producer assets. Livestock and 
horticulture are only marginally 
differentiated, while cassava is highly 
substitutable. 
Resilience Score: 3 
Reasoning: Moderate 
environmental resilience given 
multiple precautions to reduce soil 
Score: 4 
Reasoning: Greater environmental 
resilience due to: irrigation in 
horticulture component; cassava and 
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erosion and infertility in oil palm 
component. Greater economic 
vulnerability of producers due to 
high perishability. 
livestock as inherently resistant to 
drought; dissemination of climate 
change-resilient techniques. Neutral 
impact on economic resilience. 
Perishability Score: 2 
Reasoning: Oil palm and oilseed 
crops are highly perishable 
commodities. Few precautions 
taken to mitigate risks of producing 
perishable crops. 
Score: 3 
Reasoning: Outgrower schemes provide 
guaranteed markets. Service hubs with 
processing capacity are developed. 
Cassava is highly perishable once 
harvested. 
Income 
smoothing 
Score: 3 
Reasoning: Vertical integration in 
oil palm component. Improved 
information flows and possible 
contract price arrangements in 
oilseed component. 
Score: 4 
Reasoning: Year-round vegetable 
production in horticulture component. 
Outgrower schemes provide regularised 
income. Fodder banks in red meat 
component. 
Governance of 
linkages 
Score: 4 
Reasoning: Vertical integration and 
an emphasis on horizontal 
coordination in the oil palm 
component. The development of an 
industry-wide forum to coordinate 
activities in the oilseed component. 
Risks of excess market power in the 
hands of OPUL. 
Score: 5 
Reasoning: Establishing and 
strengthening producers' organisations 
in all value chain components. Vertical 
integration by producers in cassava and 
red meat components. Strong vertical 
coordination through outgrower 
schemes. 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on IFAD, 2010c and IFAD, 2012c 
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Conclusions and recommendations for future research 
 
This paper was motivated by a desire to examine scepticism regarding the potential for 
value chain projects to achieve pro-poor outcomes. The starting assumption of the paper 
was that, over time, value chains tend to scale. This was thought to increase the likelihood 
that poor producers would either be marginalised within chains, or excluded from them 
altogether. However, the available evidence indicates that under certain conditions, pro-
poor outcomes can be achieved. As a result, this paper’s focus has been the identification 
of the principal determinants of pro-poor outcomes in value chains. 
 
The primary contribution of this paper has been the development of a testable analytical 
typology, which may guide future value chain interventions towards achieving pro-poor 
outcomes. The typology has been developed through a three-stage process. First, a review 
of relevant donor documents and academic literature was conducted. This review focused 
on the available evidence of the effects of commodity-specific factors and governance 
structures on the terms of value chain participation. Second, key lessons were drawn from 
this review to identify factors affecting the terms by which poor producers are likely to 
participate in value chains. These factors were 
 
• Labour intensity 
• Asset specificity 
• Commodity differentiation 
• Long-run price stability 
• Perishability 
• Time-horizon and frequency of benefits 
• Vertical coordination 
• Lead firm 
• Horizontal coordination 
• Vertical integration by producers’ associations 
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Third, a typology synthesised these factors into six key determinants of pro-poor outcomes. 
These determinants were operationalised along a series of dynamic spectrums. These were 
 
i. Labour intensity 
ii. Specificity 
iii. Resilience 
iv. Perishability 
v. Income smoothing 
vi. Governance of linkages 
 
Next, this typology was applied to two on-going IFAD value chain projects. This was done 
for two principal reasons. First, it illustrated the extent to which these two projects 
mentioned and addressed the six key determinants that comprise the typology. Second, 
these two cases exemplified how the typology can be applied to value chain project designs 
to hypothesise the likelihood of projects achieving pro-poor outcomes. The intention is that 
future projects will utilise similar hypotheses to test the typology’s explanatory power (for 
a proposed methodology, see Appendix). 
 
In conclusion, the contribution of this paper has been the development of a typology which 
may help guide future value chain project designs. This typology is not an exhaustive guide, 
but rather a step in a continually evolving process. In contrast to previous value chain 
guides (e.g. Kula et al., 2006), which have attempted to provide prescriptive practitioner 
guidelines for the development of value chains projects, this paper has focused exclusively 
on improving the analysis and design stages. The aim of this process is to increase the 
likelihood of value chain projects’ efficient achievement of substantive pro-poor outcomes. 
The continuing nature of this process highlights the need for more rigorous monitoring and 
evaluations of value chain projects. The hope is that the academic and development 
communities will build on this work, and incorporate its insights in future value chain 
development. 
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Appendix - Testing the typology 
 
The following is an ideal methodology to test the effect of the participation in a value chain 
project (key explanatory variable) on pro-poor outcomes (i.e. explained variable), 
controlling for the following - largely binary - variables: (i) geographic (e.g. sub-Saharan 
Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia); (ii) demographic (e.g. years of 
education, age, gender, race, health); and (iii) socio-political (e.g. democratic system, 
political partisanship of government). 
 
An ideal test will be proceed as follows. First, a selection of sample of projects is needed. 
These projects should cover geographic, demographic, commodity and governance 
variances. Second, the typology should be applied to each project to establish a series of 
null hypotheses regarding the likelihood of achieving pro-poor outcomes. Third, household-
level panel data should be collected on poor producers participating in each of the value 
chain projects (i.e. the treatment group),  and for an identical control group, before and 
after project implementation (i.e. the treatment). Fourth, a difference-in-differences model 
should be used to identify the change in the effect on poor producers of participating in a 
value chain project, taking into account the effect on the non-participating control group. 
The null hypotheses are either rejected, or fail to be rejected on the basis of the result. 
 
However, there are practical constraints on this ideal methodology. These include: (i) 
difficulty in identifying a suitable control group which will be isolated from the spill-over 
effects from the value chain project; (ii) selection bias is likely to arise due to 
entrepreneurial poor producers self-selecting to participate in value chain projects; and (iii) 
attritional effects are likely to bias results, as those poor producers most likely to benefit 
from participation in a value chain project will survive the treatment. 
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